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L 
Sweatt v. Painter, the End of Segregation, and 
the Transformation of Education Law 
Jonathan L. Entin* 
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education 1 
was a watershed event. In that unanimous ruling, the Court re-
pudiated two of its most embarrassing opinions: Scott v. Sand-
ford,2 which suggested that blacks had no rights which whites 
were bound to respect, and Pless_v v. Ferguson, 3 which endorsed the 
"separate but equal" doctrine. Brown has rightly been called 
"probably the most important American governmental act of any 
kind since the Emancipation Proclamation."4 This landmark case 
not only made clear that officially supported racial discrimination 
violated the Constitution, but it also served as a catalyst for the 
modern civil rights movement, leading to sweeping changes in 
American law and society.5 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I have accumu-
lated numerous personal and intellectual debts in the course of this project. Victor G. 
Rosenblum encouraged my initial curiosity about the Sweatt case. This Article could not 
have been written without his wise and generous counsel. Judge A. Leon Higginbo-
tham,Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit offered his support 
and assistance to this work at a crucial stage. John T. Hubbell kindly shared his knowl-
edge of the desegregation of the University of Oklahoma with me. The staff of the Case 
Western Reserve law library, especially Pat Harris, Dan Kowal, and Rosanna Masley, 
performed herculean "feats in response to my never-ending requests for information. My 
colleagues Melvyn Durchslag and William P. Marshall offered a number of useful sug-
gestions on an earlier draft. I thank all of them for their contributions and absolve each 
from responsibility for the errors of omission or commission that remain. 
1. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). . 
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The opinion in Brown does not mention Dred 
Scott. The result in that case was, of course, effectively overruled by the Civil War and by 
the thirteenth amendment. Consequently, the Court never was forced to repudiate that 
decision and had not done so before 1954. Both the result and the reasoning of Brown, 
however, mark a complete rejection of that old case. 
3. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
4. 2 THE CoNSTITUTION AND THE SuPREME CouRT: A DocuMENTARY HrsTORY 266 
(L. Pollak ed. 1966); see also Pollak, Thurgood Marshall: Lawyer and justice, 40 Mn. L. REv. 
405,406 (1981) ("assuredly the most important litigation of any kind in any court since 
the Civil War"). 
5. The Court promptly extended Brown in a series of per curiam orders to find 
racial segregation unconstitutional in a variety of other contexts. New Orleans City Park 
3 
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At the time, however, Brown was intensely controversial. Crit-
ics denounced the Court for arbitrarily and abruptly overturning 
Plessy on the basis of fuzzy sociological theories rather than legal 
Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (municipal parks); Gayle v. Browder, 
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (city buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (munic-
ipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches). 
More significantly, however, much of the constitutional jurisprudence of the past gener-
ation, particularly with respect to free speech, has arisen in the context of civil rights 
activities that took place in the wake of Brown. E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 
458 U.S. 886 (1982); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Walker 
v. City ofBirmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation 
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex mi. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 ( 1958). See generally H. KALVEN,jR., THE NEGRO AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965). 
Among the federal statutes that were adopted after Brown, and as a result of forces 
set in motion by that decision, are the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 
Stat. 634 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 28 & 42 U.S.C. (1982)); 
the Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449,74 Stat. 86 (1960) (codified in scattered 
sections of 18, 20 & 42 U.S.C. (1982)); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of28 & '12 U.S.C. (1982)); 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1982)); and the Civil Rights Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18, 25, 28 & 42 U.S.C. (1982)). 
In the generation following Bmwn, blacks have made significant progress and 
gained increased opportunities in education and employment, although substantial ra-
cial differentials remain. See generally R. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES: NARROWING THE 
GAP? (1984); P. BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, jOBS, AND POLITICS 125-54 (1985); D. 
FEATHERMAN & R. HAUSER, OPPORTUNITY AND CHANGE 313-84 (1978); W. WILSON, THE 
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 88-164 (2d ed. 1980). 
Moreover, blacks have made important political breakthroughs during the same pe-
riod. Both the number and the proportion of eligible blacks registered to vote have 
increased dramatically since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. S. REP. No. 
417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, TepTintedin 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &AD. NEWS 177, 183; M. 
BARONE & G. Uj!FUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1984, at 639 (1983); 
O'Rourke, Voting Rights .tlct Amendments of 1982: The New Bailout Provision and ViTginia, 69 
VA. L. REV. 765, 769-70 (1983). In addition, the number of black elected officials in-
creased from no more than 280 in 1964 to 4,607 in 1979. Eisinger, Black Employment in 
Municipal jobs: The impact of Blacil Political PoweT, 76 AM. PoL. Scr. REV. 380, 380 n.1 
(1982). To put the matter in more graphic terms, George Wallace and Strom Thur-
mond, both of whom came to power as diehard segregationists, actively sought black 
support in their last campaigns, and neither might have been elected without that sup-
port. M. BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, supra, at 2, 1062; Chris. Sci. Monitor, Nov. 4, 1982, at 
13, col. 1 (midwestern ed.); N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1983, at I, col. 2. Indeed, Wallace 
issued a formal proclamation on the occasion of the first observance of the birthday of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as a federal holiday and had it read from the very spot from 
which he had promised to maintain "segregation forever" in his first inaugural speech in 
1963. Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1986, at AI. 
1986] SWEATT V. PAINTER AND EDUCATION LAW 5 
principles and for usurping the legislative function of the states.6 
In fact, Brown marked the culmination of a carefully planned liti-
gation strategy that was designed to chip away at "separate but 
equal" one step at a time. 7 The most significant of these prelimi-
nary cases was Sweatt v. Painter, 8 which effectively outlawed segre-
gated law schools and "extensively undermine[d]"9 the "separate 
but equal" doctrine. Yet the critics never mentioned these ear-
lier decisions. Today, when Brown seems a settled part of Ameri-
can jurisprudence, 10 those cases have faded from memory. Even 
in the leading constitutional law casebooks, they are relegated to 
the status of side notes if they appear at all. 11 
6. E.g., Declaration of Constitutional Principles, 102 GoNG. REc. 4460-61,4515-16 
(1956); R. GORDON, NINE MEN AGAINST AMERICA 79-95 (1958). 
The Declaration of Constitutional Principles has come to be referred to as the 
Southern Manifesto, a joint statement issued by 19 Senators and 77 Representatives on 
March 12, 1956. The Manifesto denounced Brown as "clear abuse of judicial power" 
and pledged support for "those States which have declared the intention to resist forced 
integration by any lawful means." 
One critic did recognize that some more recent decisions foreshadowed Brown, but 
nevertheless regarded that ruling as having done violence to the Constitution. J. KILPA-
TRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES 256-57 (1957). 
7. The litigation campaign that culminated in Brown is exhaustively chronicled in R. 
KLUGER, SIMPLE jUSTICE (1975). 
8. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
9. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36 (1950); 
see also L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS 340-41 ( 1966). 
10. The strongest critics of judicial activism now recognize the continuing vitality of 
Brown. No serious commentator today suggests that this decision be reconsidered, 
although some would justify the ruling on grounds other than those advanced by the 
Court. See, e.g., G. McDoWELL, EQ.UITY AND THE CoNSTITUTION 131-32 (1982); Bork, Neu-
tral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1971). Attorney 
General Edwin Meese, who argues for a constitutional jurisprudence based firmly upon 
the framers' intent and who has repeatedly condemned much of the work of the modern 
Supreme Court as "chameleon jurisprudence," supports Brown. He cites the Plessy deci-
sion as a prime example of the serious errors that flow from ignoring original intent. 
See, e.g., Meese, Constnting the Constitution, 19 U.C.D. L. REV. 22, 27 (1985). And Raoul 
Berger, who has devoted much of the past decade to arguing that the framers of the 
fourteenth amendment did not intend to abolish segregation in education, repeatedly 
emphasizes that he supports the result in Brown; he claims to oppose only the propriety 
of judicial resolution of the controversy. R. BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY jUDICIARY 4, 8, 
117, 327,342 (1977). 
Even those who regarded Bmwn as wrong on the merits seem reconciled to the 
decision as an enduring part of the legal landscape. For example, James J. Kilpatrick, 
the editor of the editorial page of the Richmond News Leader when the case was de-
cided, served as the intellectual architect of Massive Resistance. See J. KILPATRICK, THE 
SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION (1956). Today he offers "no apologies" for 
his role. Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1982, at Al. Nevertheless, Kilpatrick has long since 
given up the fight to overturn the ruling. 
11. Sweatt is discussed in a footnote in the two most widely used casebooks. See G. 
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The obscurity into which Sweatt has fallen is unfortunate for 
several reasons. First, the decision was the result of extraordi-
nary professional work by a team of outstanding lawyers. This 
Symposium is an overdue occasion for recognizing their superior 
efforts. Second, the Supreme Court's opinion relied heavily 
upon an excellent amicus curiae brief submitted by nearly 200 
law professors. Examination of that brief may yield insight into 
the influence of nonparties in constitutional litigation. Third, the 
rulings in Sweatt and its companion cases 12 set the stage for 
Brown. Sweatt's attorneys and that influential amicus brief first 
nrP~PntPrl "lrtn~llu -::all nfthP -:.rrrttrnPnt~ t'h-:tt ~n cro.rn~"t.uh.,t r£l.h ...... ..r::::::r.rl t".a. .._u..._ ... _...._.._.._.... 1' ,._ ... 1-l.A~..._..._ J Ll..&..& ..._, .... .._ ..... ..._ Ll..& 0 '-l...I..I..&'-JL.&l..L.l' \...I..I.U\.' .1..1.1. '-'V.l.l..l'- l'l' .lJ.QL .1 \....lJ.l..l'-U 
form, would prove decisive in the school segregation decision. 
As a result, the Court resolved the case in a way that made the 
ruling in Brown much easier than it otherwise would have been. 
Finally, Sweatt had implications beyond the equal protection con-
text: it marked the first time that the Court looked beyond the 
form to the substance of education. In this sense, the decision 
provided a basis for more exacting judicial scrutiny of the aca-
demic environment. 
This Article will analyze these aspects of the Sweatt case. Part 
I describes the facts leading to the litigation. Part II examines 
the Supreme Court precedents facing Sweatt's attorneys, both in 
the area of school segregation and in the field of education gen-
erally. This section concludes that the Court at best seemed pre-
pared only to enforce the Plessy doctrine, and none too rigorously 
at that. Part III focuses upon the process of making the record at 
the trial. This section demonstrates how Sweatt's counsel took 
advantage of ambiguities in the prior cases to lead the Court to 
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 636 n.6 (11th ed. 1985); W. LOCKHART, Y. MMISAR &J. 
CHOPER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 1268 n.b (5th ed. 
1980). The case is the subject of a textual note in others. See, e.g., J. BARRON & C. 
DIENES, CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND PoLICY 510 (2d ed. 1982); P. BREST & S. 
LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 406-07 (2d ed. 1983). Still 
others do not separately discuss Sweatt at all. See, e.g., E. BARRETT & W. CoHEN, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1985); R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES (2d ed. 1985). 
Sweatt has fared somewhat better in the treatises. One leading reference work de-
votes a detailed paragraph to the case. J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA &J. YouNG, CoNSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 631 (2d ed. 1983). Professor Tribe, on the other hand, discusses it in a 
footnote. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1020 n.6 (1978). 
12. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); 
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950). 
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address the realities of segregated education. Part IV analyzes 
the proceedings in the Supreme Court and the ultimate decision 
in the case. This section examines the factors which may have led 
the Court to rule as it did, including the record made by Sweatt's 
attorneys, the law professors' amicus brief, the cumulative impact 
of the companion cases, the position of the Truman administra-
tion, and larger societal developments. Finally, part V briefly ex-
plores the effects and implications of the Sweatt decision for 
related legal issues. 
I. The Road to Court 
On February 26, 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black postal 
worker with "a yen to become a lawyer," 13 applied for admission 
to The University ofTexas School ofLaw. 14 Since the state con-
stitution required racial segregation in education, 15 University 
President Theophilus Shickel Painter explained that Sweatt could 
not be enrolled. 16 Painter's letter rejecting Sweatt's application 
informed him that, as an alternative, the state would provide him 
with the opportunity to pursue his studies by creating a 
"colored" law school. 17 Sweatt declined this offer. Instead, rep-
resented by a team of NAACP attorneys headed by Thurgood 
Marshall, 18 he filed suit to compel The University of Texas to ad-
mit him. 
From the beginning, Heman Sweatt's attempt to break the 
13. L. MILLER, supra note 9, at 338. At the time, there were only 23 black lawyers in 
Texas, although the state had a black population exceeding 800,000. R. KLUGER, supra 
note 7, at 260. 
14. Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1948, writ 
refd), rev'd, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
15. "Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and im-
partial provision shall be made for both." TEx. CoNsT. art. 7, § 7 (repealed 1969). 
16. For further discussion of Heman Sweatt's background, see infra notes 19-22 and 
accompanying text. 
Theophilus Shickel Painter was a highly respected cytogeneticist who had first re-
ported the widely accepted-but erroneous-finding that the human cell contained 48 
chromosomes. Painter's 1921 research was consistently replicated untill955, when two 
Swedish researchers, applying recently developed techniques, discovered that the cor-
rect number of chromosomes was 46. D. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS 238-41 
(1985). 
17. Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall as a Lawyer: The Campaign Against School Segregation, 
1946-1950, 40 Mo. L. REv. 411, 427 (1981). 
18. Sweatt was initially represented by W J. Durham of Dallas. Durham was a coop-
erating attorney for the NAACP. He in turn involved the national legal staff of the or-
ganization. Marshall was the NAACP's chief counsel. 
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color bar at The University of Texas raised questions. There 
was, first, the matter of his academic qualifications. In one 
sense, those were entirely in order: he had graduated with hon-
ors from Wiley College. 19 In another, they were not: that all-
black institution was unaccredited. This fact offered the Univer-
sity a convenient nonracial basis for refusing to enroll him.20 
There was also the question ofhis motive for applying. Although 
he was a man of "sterling character,"21 some people wondered 
"whether [he] earnestly desired to study law."22 
Long before Sweatt applied to the Texas law school, the issue 
of higher education for blacks had been a matter of public con-
troversy in the state. While the state constitution authorized the 
establishment of "a College or Branch University" for blacks,23 
that provision had not been implemented when Sweatt applied to 
The University ofTexas.24 A year earlier, however, the state leg-
islature had enacted a statute providing for the establishment, 
"[w]henever there is any demand for same," of black-only profes-
sional programs that were "substantially equivalent to those of-
fered at the University of Texas."25 Since no black law school 
19. Q.jOHNSON, PRICE OF fREEDOM 2 (1954). 
20. Tushnet, supra note 17, at 427. The state never cited Wiley College's lack of 
accreditation as a basis for denying Sweatt's application. The explanation for this appar-
ent oversight is not entirely clear, but it may be that The University of Texas previously 
had accepted white graduates of unaccredited institutions. If so, this reason for re-
jecting Sweatt would have been exposed rather easily as entirely pretextual. Cf C. TRIL-
LIN, AN EDUCATION IN GEORGIA 38 (1964) (attorneys for highly qualified black applicant 
to University of Georgia who had been rejected solely on basis of preadmission inter-
view showed that many white students were interviewed only after they had enrolled). 
The president of the University of Oklahoma chose not to rely upon the lack of accredi-
tation of the undergraduate college of the first black applicant to the law school precisely 
because the university had accepted white transfer students from unaccredited institu-
tions. G. CROSS, BLACKS IN WHITE COLLEGES 39 (1975). 
21. O.joHNSON, supra note 19, at 2, 27. 
22. !d. at 2. At trial, the state asked Sweatt numerous questions suggesting that the 
NAACP had put him up to refusing to attend any all-black law school and to demanding 
admission to The University of Texas. E.g., Record at 174, 176, 177-78, 180, 182-83, 
184-86, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Record]. 
23. TEX. CaNST. art. 7, § 14. 
24. See Hornsby, The "Colored Branch University" Issue in Texas-Prelude to Sweatt vs. 
Painter, 61]. NEGRO HIST. 51, 55-58 (1976). 
25. Act of June 1, 1945, ch. 308, 1945 Tex. Gen. Laws 506 (repealed 194 7). This 
statute changed the name of Prairie View State Normal and Industrial College for Ne-
groes to Prairie View University. Section 2, which permitted the creation of black-only 
professional curricula at the institution provided: 
Whenever there is any demand for same, the Board of Directors of the 
Agricultural and Mechanical College, in addition to the courses of study now 
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existed at the time, the trial court continued the case for s1x 
months to give the state a chance to establish one.26 
In response, the state Board of Regents authorized the crea-
tion of a law school for blacks as part of Prairie View University _27 
Two black lawyers were hired as part-time instructors for the in-
stitution, which consisted of a pair of rented rooms in Houston. 28 
When the proceedings resumed, the trial judge held that these 
actions satisfied the constitutional mandate of separate but equal 
facilities. 29 
While Sweatt's appeal was pending, however, the legislature 
repealed the earlier statute under which the Prairie View law 
school had been authorized. It was replaced by a law creating the 
Texas State University for Negroes.30 This was to be "a univer-
sity of the first class"31 that would offer a wide range of courses, 
"all of which [were to] be equivalent to those offered at The Uni-
versity of Texas. " 32 The new university was to be located m 
authorized for said institution, is authorized to provide for the establishment of 
courses in law, medicine, engineering, pharmacy,journalism, or any other gen-
erally recognized college course taught at the University of Texas, in said Prai-
rie View University, which courses shall be substantially equivalent to those 
offered at the University of Texas. 
26. Sweatt v. Painter, No. 74,945 (!26th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., June 26, 
1946); 210 S.W.2d at 446. 
27. Minute Order No. 203-46, Board of Directors, Agricultural and Mechanical Col-
lege of Texas, Dec. 4, 1946; 210 S.W.2d at 446. 
28. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 261; Tushnet, supra note 17, at 428. 
29. Sweatt v. Painter, No. 74,945 (!26th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 17, 
1946); 210 S.W.2d at 446. 
30. Act of March 3, 1947, ch. 29, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 36; 210 S.W.2d at 446-47. 
The new university may have been created because the state recognized the frailty 
of its legal position. Tushnet, supra note 17, at 428. Prairie View, of which the original 
black law school was to be a part, was a weak institution that counted such vocational 
courses as mattress-making and broom-making toward the bachelor'~ degree. R. 
KLUGER, supra note 7, at 261. Whatever the explanation, Governor Beauford Jester pro-
posed to create Texas State shortly after his inauguration in January 1947. Previous 
proposals to establish a full-fledged university for blacks had foundered on a state con-
stitutional prohibition on the use of general revenues for the purpose. This obstacle was 
surmounted because the state had accumulated a $120 million surplus that was available 
to fund the new institution. See O.JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 7; Hornsby, supra note 24, 
at 59. 
31. Act of March 3, 1947, supra note 30, § I. 
32. !d. § 2. This section provided in relevant part: 
The Texas State University for Negroes shall offer all other courses of higher 
learning, including, but without limitation, (other than as to those professional 
courses designated for The Prairie View Agricultural and Mechanical College), 
arts and sciences, literature, law, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, journalism, ed-
ucation, and other professional courses, all of which shall be equivalent to 
those offered at The University of Texas. Upon demand being made by any 
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Houston, but until it began operations there, a temporary law 
school would open in Austin.33 These developments prompted 
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals to vacate the trial court's judg-
ment and remand the case for further proceedings.34 
II. The Legal Background 
An appreciation of the early procedural maneuvers requires 
some understanding of the law of race relations as well as an 
overview of the law of education as both had evolved through the 
end ofvVorld \Afar II. Although the interest of the national gov-
ernment in education antedates the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, 35 the Supreme Court had little occasion to consider the 
subject before Sweatt. Most of the cases involving schools and 
colleges in fact presented standard questions of the law of con-
tract, 36 the rules of descent, 37 or the extent of state regulatory 
powers.38 The few decisions which focused upon the educational 
qualified applicant for any present or future course of instruction offered at 
The University of Texas, or its branches, such course shall be established or 
added to the curriculum of the appropriate division of the schools hereby es-
tablished in order that the separate universities for Negroes shall at all times 
offer equal educational opportunities and training as that available to other 
persons of this state. 
33. !d. § 11; 210 S.W.2d at 446-47. 
34. Sweatt v. Painter, No. 9619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, Mar. 26, 1947); 210 
S.W.2d at 446. 
35. For example, the Northwest Ordinance provided: "Religion, morality, and 
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools 
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Ordinance of July 13, 1787, 
art. III, 32 J. CoNT. CoNG. 334, 340-41 (R. Hill ed. 1936). For discussion of the back-
ground and implementation of this language, see Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
173, 177-79 (1855). Cf Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,443 n.9 (1962) (Douglas,]., con-
curring) (religion no longer a function of public schools). 
36. E.g., Indiana ex. rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (tenure); Dodge v. 
Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1938) (pension rights of teachers); City of New 
Orleans v. Fisher, 180 U.S. 185 (1899) (use of tax funds for payment ofjudgment credi-
tor); Bryan v. Board of Educ., 151 U.S. 639 (1894) (interpretation of college charter 
provision); Atchison Bd. of Educ. v. DeKay, 148 U.S. 591 (1893) (validity of school 
bonds); Doon Township v. Cummins, 142 U.S. 366 (1892) (same); McGahey v. Virginia, 
135 U.S. 662 (1890) (same); The Pennsylvania College Cases, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 190 
(1871) (interpretation of college charter provision). 
37. E.g., Cornell Univ. v. Fiske, 136 U.S. 152 (1890) (validity of bequest); McDo-
nagh's Ex'rs v. Murdoch, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 367 (1853) (will contest). 
38. E.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (pupil vaccination requirement); Waugh 
v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915) (regulation banning fraternities from state 
university); Wyoming v. Irvine, 206 U.S. 278 (1907) (control of federal land grant 
funds); Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905) (alteration of school district boundaries); 
Buchanan v. City of Litchfield, 102 U.S. 278 (1880) (school district bonding limits); Da-
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1rocess suggested that the Justices would apply minimum scru-
iny unless some favored value were at stake. The Court had 
i.ven scant indication that it regarded genuine racial equality as 
uch a value. 
The Segregation Cases 
1. Deference to state policy.-The "separate but equal" doctrine 
ad its origin in a transportation suit, but it quickly spread to the 
eld of education.39 In Plessy v. Ferguson,40 the Court upheld a 
ouisiana statute that required segregated railway carriages 
gainst a challenge by a black plaintiff.41 Mter summarily dis-
tissing his thirteenth amendment claim,42 the majority found no 
iolation of the fourteenth amendment.43 Justice Brown empha-
zed that the Constitution sought to establish political, as op-
osed to social, equality.44 Therefore, laws providing for racial 
!gregation did not necessarily imply the inferiority of one group 
, another.45 As he explained for the Court: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument 
; v. Indiana, 94 U.S. 792 (1876) (apportionment of school funds); Springfield Town· 
ip v. Quick, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 56 (1859) (same); Board ofTrustees v. Indiana, 55 U.S. 
i How.) 268 (1852) (control of college); see also Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College, 
1 U.S. 636 (1911) (tort liability); infra notes 120-179 and accompanying text. 
39. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 & n.6 (1954). Segregated schools 
parently were approved judicially for the first time in a Massachusetts case in which 
1arles Sumner represented the unsuccessful black plaintiff. Roberts v. City of Boston, 
Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849). The state legislature thereafter prohibited separate 
wols. Ch. 256, 1855 Mass. Acts 674. For discussion of the voluminous litigation con-
·ning the constitutionality and equality of such separate schools in state and lower 
leral courts, see D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAw 368-71 (2d ed. 1980); 
rson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 470, 482 n.27; Leflar & Davis, 
Tegation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARv. L. REv. 377, 430-35 (1954). 
40. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
41. Homer Plessy, the plaintiff, claimed that he was only one-eighth black and that 
could pass for white, id. at 541, but did not argue that the state law should not apply 
him on that account. 
42. !d. at 542-43. The Court found the lack of conflict between the statute and the 
rteenth amendment "too clear for argument." !d. at 542. 
43. !d. at 552. 
44. !d. Perhaps to defuse suggestions that Plessy was a product of peculiarly South-
' attitudes and experiences, defenders of the decision have taken pains to point out 
tjustice Henry Billings Brown, the author of the majority opinion, was born and bred 
·ankee. Thus, in Sweatt, the state appellate court observed that Justice Brown was a 
ive of Massachusetts who was educated at Yale and Harvard, and who practiced and 
ved as a state and federal judge in Michigan before his appointment to the Court. 
I S.W.2d at 444 n.2. 
45. 163 U.S. at 544. 
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to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the 
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If 
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but 
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it. 46 
In support of this proposition, he pointed to "the establishment 
of separate schools for white and colored children, which ha[ d] 
been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by 
courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have 
been longest and most earnestly enforced. "47 The only limita-
tion on the exercise of this power was that of reasonableness, and 
Louisiana had not contravened that limitation.48 
The first Justice Harlan, in a celebrated and solitary dissent, 
viewed the state's arguments as disingenuous.49 He pointedly 
observed: 
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in 
the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from rail-
road cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from 
coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. . . . The 
thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accom-
modation for whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to 
themselves while travelling in railroad passenger coaches. No 
one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary.50 
Then, in one of the most famous sentences in Americanjurispru-
dence, he concluded: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and 
46. !d. at 551. 
47. !d. at 544. In support of this statement, the Court cited Roberts v. City of Bos-
ton, 59 Mass. (5 Gush.) 198 (1849), but failed to note that the state legislature had en-
acted a statute soon afterward that effectively overturned that decision. See supra note 
39. The Court also noted that Congress had provided for separate schools in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 163 U.S. at 545. 
48. 163 U.S. at 550. This limitation would prevent states from requiring separate 
streetcars for persons with hair of a certain color or for aliens or individuals of a particu-
lar national origin, and from enacting laws prescribing that blacks and whites walk on 
opposite sides of the street or live in houses or operate vehicles of different colors. !d. at 
549-50. The plaintiff had argued that none of these regulations would conflict with the 
logic of "separate but equal." !d. at 549. 
49. !d. at 552-64 (Harlan,]., dissenting). While defenders of segregation emphasize 
Justice Brown's Northern background, see supra note 44, most people overlook Justice 
Harlan's history as a slaveholder and opponent of federal efforts to protect the rights of 
blacks, including the Emancipation Proclamation, the Reconstruction amendments to 
the Constitution, and Reconstruction civil rights statutes. See generally Westin,jolzn Mm·-
slzall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southeme1·, 66 
YALE L.j. 637, 638-54 (1957). 
50. 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. " 51 
Nevertheless, only three years later he wrote the unanimous 
opinion in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 52 a deci-
sion which appeared implicitly to approve the operation of seg-
regated schools. In that case, a group of black parents and 
taxpayers challenged the closing of the one high school in their 
county open to black children while high schools available only 
to whites continued to operate.53 The board argued that it 
lacked the funds to provide both primary and secondary schools 
for blacks and that it could better fulfill the educational needs of 
the black population by training the larger number of elementary 
school pupils instead of the smaller group of high schoolers.54 
At oral argument the plaintiffs explicitly challenged the con-
stitutionality of separate schools. The Court, however, refused 
to consider that argument because it had not been raised in the 
pleadings.55 Justice Harlan went on to point out that the ag-
grieved blacks could not benefit from the relief they were seek-
ing, since an injunction would close the white high school rather 
than compel the board to maintain a black institution. 56 The rec-
ord contained no evidence that the board of education intention-
ally discriminated against the black children. 5 7 In the absence of 
a "clear and unmistakable disregard" of federally protected 
rights, education was exclusively a matter of state concern.58 
Hence, black high school students had no enforceable right to 
attend a public school, and black parents could be compelled to 
51. !d. at 559. 
52. 175 u.s. 528 (1899). 
53. !d. at 530-31. 
54. !d. at 532-33. The board noted the availability of private schools open to blacks 
at no greater cost to them than a public school. !d. at 534-35, 544. 
55. !d. at 543. 
56. !d. at 544. 
57. !d.; cJ. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976) (showing of discrimina-
tory intent or invidious motivation required to establish violation of equal protection 
clause). 
The Cumming Court noted that "different questions might have arisen" had the 
plaintiffs sought to compel the board to operate a black high school and the board re-
fused out of racial bias to do so. 175 U.S. at 545. In fact, the plaintiffs had prayed for 
"such other and further relief as [is] equitable andjust," id. at 531, a prayer that might 
have supported such an order. 
58. !d. at 545. But see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting racial superiority of whites, at least as to wealth, prestige, achievement, and 
power). This latter statement at least raises the possibility that the Court failed to ex-
amine alternative forms of relief out of its own racial prejudice. 
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pay taxes to support a system from which their children were 
excluded. 
Less than a decade later, in Berea College v. Kentucky, 59 the 
Court upheld a state law which imposed criminal penalties upon 
parties who conducted racially mixed classes. 60 Although the 
statute applied to individuals and associations as well as corpora-
tions, the majority held it severable and found no impropriety 
insofar as it affected the college as a state-chartered corpora-
tion. 61 Since Kentucky had reserved an explicit right of amend-
ment when it issued the college's charter and the segregation 
requirement did not prevent Berea from carrying out its educa-
tional purposes, 62 the decision rested upon an adequate state 
ground.63 The Court implied, however, that proceedings against 
an individual might raise federal constitutional issues not present 
in this suit.64 
Once again, Justice Harlan dissented. On the procedural 
side, he maintained that the statute was not severable. It was ap-
parent that the state sought to forbid racially mixed instruction 
no matter who conducted the class; restricting the prohibition to 
59. 211 u.s. 45 (1908). 
60. I d. at 58. For the full text of the statute, see id. at 59 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
61. Jd. at 54-55. 
62. Jd. at 56-57. On the significance of the state's reservation of an explicit right to 
amend the charter, see infra note 130 and accompanying text. The state court had found 
that the college could teach persons of different races at different times or in different 
places. Therefore, the institution still could carry out its mission. 211 U.S. at 57. 
63. 211 U.S. at 54, 58. 
64. Jd. at 54. However objectionable the result in this case may seem to the contem-
porary mind, it is sobering to contemplate that the decision could have had much uglier 
implications. The opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals rested on the proposition 
that blacks were a lower order of species. The state court emphasized the overriding 
importance of maintaining "the purity of racial blood" and paid homage to "[t]he natu-
ral law which forbids [racial] intermarriage, and that social amalgamation which leads to 
a corruption of the races .... From social amalgamation it is but a step to illicit inter-
course, and but another to intermarriage." Berea College v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 
209, 225-26, 94 S.W. 623, 628 (1906). 
The Supreme Court must have made a conscious decision to avoid this basis for 
upholding the state law. These racist arguments were plainly before it. Kentucky Attor-
ney General James Breathitt devoted several pages of his brief urging the Court to take 
judicial notice of a series of scientific studies of cranial and genetic differences that pur-
ported to support the state's position. Brief for Defendant in Error at 4, 38-42, Berea 
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). For contrasting analyses of these arguments, 
see A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: THE jUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-21, at 731 n.lQ (1984); 
Hovenkamp, Social Science and Desegregation Before Brown, 1985 DuKE LJ. 624, 631-37. 
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corporations defied common sense.65 On the merits, he insisted 
that the state could not bar racially mixed instruction.66 He lim-
ited his position to state regulation of private schools, however, 
explicitly reserving the question of the legitimacy of segregated 
public education.67 
By the time of Gong Lum v. Rice,68 the validity of school segre-
gation seemed unquestioned. In that case, an American child of 
Chinese descent was barred from attending the local white high 
school because officials had classified her as colored.69 Chief jus-
tice Taft, for a unanimous Court, 70 peremptorily rejected her 
equal protection challenge, noting that many cases had permitted 
states to operate separate schools without federal intervention. 
That those decisions had involved black plaintiffs was immaterial; 
Orientals could be classified as nonwhite.71 
There were three bright spots in this otherwise dismal pic-
ture. In McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,72 the Court 
suggested that a statute authorizing railroads to provide luxury 
cars for whites but not for blacks was unconstitutional. By impli-
cation, "separate but equal" required at least some form of "sep-
arate" provision for blacks; whatever the criterion of equality, 
nothing could not be equivalent to something. This observation 
was pregnant with significance, for it represented "a challenge to 
the entire structure of Jim Crow law built up since the [end of 
65. 211 U.S. at 61-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 67-68. 
67. Id. at 69. 
68. 275 u.s. 78 (1927). 
69. Id. at 80, 82. 
70. The Court included Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, who are widely 
viewed as among the most liberal members to have served up to that time. Stone, of 
course, wrote the famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 {1938), the leading text for judicial protection of minority rights. See 
Cover, The Origins of judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE LJ. 1287, 1289-
97 (1982). Holmes, however, was notably unsympathetic to racial equality claims. For 
example, he joined the majority opinion in Berea College and in a number of decisions 
upholding state laws requiring segregation in transportation. He dissented in Bailey v. 
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), an important thirteenth amendment case, after having 
written the opinion for the Court disposing of the controversy at an earlier stage on 
procedural grounds. Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452 (1908). See generally Rogat, Mr. 
Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion (pt. 2), 15 STAN. L. REV. 254, 255-75 (1963). 
71. 275 U.S. at 85-87. The Chief Justice discussed Cumming, Plessy, and Roberts, and 
cited more than a dozen other state and federal cases. !d. 
72. 235 u.s. 151 (1914). 
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Reconstruction]." 73 In Buchanan v. Warley/4 the Court unani-
mously invalidated a municipal ordinance that prohibited any 
person from moving into any house located in any block in which 
a m;:Uority of houses were occupied by members of another 
race. 75 And in Guinn v. United States / 6 all of the participating Jus-
tices joined an opinion striking down under the fifteenth amend-
ment an Oklahoma grandfather clause limiting the franchise to 
persons eligible to vote on January 1, 1866, and their lineal de-
scendants, thereby effectively barring blacks from voting. 77 
These were mixed blessings, however. The Court upheld the 
statute at issue in McCabe because the plaintiffs lacked standing to 
sue. 78 The opi.nion in Buchanan seemed more concerned that the 
ordinance interfered with private property rights than that it pro-
moted racial segregation with a vengeance.79 And the rejection 
of the grandfather clause in Guinn did not prevent the use of poll 
taxes, literacy tests, white primaries, and other devices that effec-
tively prevented blacks, for decades to come, from voting.80 
Moreover, nothing in these decisions questioned the continued 
vitality of Plessy. 81 Thus, segregation for all practical purposes 
appeared immune from constitutional attack. 
73. A. BICKEL & B. ScHMIDT, JR., supra note 64, at 783. 
74. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
75. !d. at 70, 82. 
76. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). Ironically, the proposition that this device discriminated 
against blacks was argued by Solicitor General john W. Davis, who would close his ca-
reer before the Supreme Court nearly 40 years later as the chief advocate for school 
segregation in Brown. 
77. On the same day that Guinn was decided, the Court struck down a similar grand-
father clause that defined the right to vote in municipal elections in Annapolis, Mary-
land. Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 382-83 (1915). 
78. 235 U.S. at 163-64. 
79. This is the conventional reading of the decision. For a suggestion that Buchanan 
might be read, at least in part, as upholding the civil rights of blacks as well as traditional 
property rights, see A. BicKEL & B. ScHMIDT, JR., supra note 64, at 813-17. 
80. Oklahoma managed to blunt the impact of Guinn by quickly passing a new stat-
ute giving those persons who had been disenfranchised by the grandfather clause only 
twelve days to register to vote or be forever barred. This provision ultimately was invali-
dated in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 270, 277 (1939). 
81. Indeed, the Court in McCabe appeared to reaffirm Plessy. The appearance may 
have been deceiving, however. Justice Hughes' only reference to that precedent came in 
a sentence observing that "there is no reason to doubt the correctness" of the conclu-
sion of the lower court that "separate but equal" comported with the fourteenth amend-
ment. 235 U.S. at 160. 
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2. Enforcing "separate but equal. "-Careful examination of the 
segregation precedents suggested two possible challenges to the 
"separate but equal" doctrine. First, in practice, "separate" was 
never "equal." No state-supported black college offered any 
form of graduate or professional training.82 Even worse, a 1929 
study by the NAACP revealed that segregated public school dis-
tricts typically spent up to ten times as much on a white child's 
education as they did on a black child's instruction.83 Thus, a 
series of suits designed to force equality of the separate educa-
tional institutions might be pressed. If they succeeded, substan-
tial improvements in black education would result. Indeed, the 
cost of equalizing black schools might persuade many jurisdic-
tions to abandon segregation altogether. 
Second, a close reading of the precedents suggested that the 
Supreme Court never had squarely upheld the constitutionality 
of segregation in education.84 In Curnrning, the plaintiffs had 
made a fatal procedural error. They pressed the constitutional 
issue for the first time at oral argument in the Supreme Court. 
For that reason, the Court refused to address this fundamental 
question.85 Nor had Gong Lurn involved a challenge to the validity 
of racial classifications in education. The student in that case 
claimed that, as justice Harlan had observed in Plessy, segregation 
laws were designed to isolate blacks from the rest of the popula-
tion. Since whites sought to insulate themselves from the harms 
alleged to flow from contact with blacks, Chinese-Americans 
were entitled to the same protection. Thus, she conceded the 
validity of racial classifications; she merely contested the legality 
82. Except for Howard University and Meharry Medical College, neither of which 
was state-operated, no black college had any kind of graduate or professional program 
for blacks. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 136. 
83. A subsequent analysis prepared for the NAACP pointed out: 
The study financed by the American Fund for Public Service made by the 
N.A.A.C.P. revealed that in South Carolina more than ten times as much was 
expended for the education of white children as for Negro children; that in 
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi and Alabama, more than five times as much; in 
North Carolina, Virginia, Texas, Oklahoma and Maryland, more than twice as 
much. 
N. Margold, Preliminary Report to the joint Committee Supervising the ExpendituTe of the 1930 
Appropnation by the Amencan Fund for Public Service to the NAACP, repnnted in part in J. 
GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON jUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LITIGATION 50 (1977). 
84. See id. at 50-57 (reprinting excerpts of Margold Report); see also R. KLUGER, supra 
note 7, at 133-37. 
85. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
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of the administrative determination that she was not "white" for 
purposes of school attendance.86 
Accordingly, the NAACP determined to contest the constitu-
tionality of segregation one step at a time. The ultimate goal was 
to have Plessy overruled, but the organization realized that it 
could not achieve that result all at once. Therefore, it began by 
taking that case literally: if segregation were the law, then the 
separate facilities must be truly equal. The campaign began at 
the graduate and professional level, where the absence of such 
programs in the segregating states held out the prospect of rela-
tively easy victories. At the outset, the question of what might 
constitute victory seemed less important than simply improving 
educational opportunities. And, it turned out, all of the leading 
litigation in this phase involved law schools, perhaps because of 
the importance of attorneys to the movement for racial 
equality.87 
The first breakthrough came in Maryland, where the state 
courts ordered Donald Murray admitted to the state's only law 
school.88 The plaintiff, an alumnus of Amherst College, was 
barred from the law school at the University of Maryland solely 
on racial grounds.89 Instead of allowing blacks to attend the uni-
versity, Maryland provided scholarships for them to pursue their 
legal studies outside the state.90 The Maryland Court of Appeals 
concluded that this system failed to provide substantial equality 
86. The following passage captures the essence of the student's argument: 
If there is danger in the association [with blacks], it is a danger from which 
one race is entitled to protection just the same as another. The White race may 
not legally expose the Yellow race to a danger that the dominant race recog-
nizes and, by the same laws, guards itself against. 
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 10, Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). For the full 
argument, see id. at 8-19. 
87. See Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. NEGRO EDuc. 49 (1935). Charles 
Hamilton Houston was the first legal director of the NAACP and later became dean of 
the law school at Howard University. His students at Howard included Thurgood Mar-
shall, Spottswood Robinson, Robert Carter, and several others who litigated the most 
significant segregation cases before and after Brown. See R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 
125-31, 147-56, 159-66, 179-80, 186-205. See generally G. McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: 
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983). Marshall, of 
course, now serves as Associate justice of the Supreme Court; Robinson is chiefjudge of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Carter is a mem-
ber of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
88. Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 489, 182 A. 590, 594 (1936). 
89. !d. at 480, 182 A. at 590. 
90. !d. at 485-86, 182 A. at 593. 
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since there was no assurance that any particular applicant, re-
gardless of qualifications, would receive a scholarship, the aid did 
not cover additional housing, travel, or incidental expenses, and 
the plaintiff could not study Maryland law although he planned to 
practice in the state.91 Because there was no present possibility 
of establishing a separate law school for blacks inside the state, 
only the admission of Murray to the white school could vindicate 
his personal right to equal treatment. 92 
Murray was admitted to the University of Maryland and com-
pleted the regular course of study without academic or social dif-
ficulty. At commencement, he was handed his diploma by 
Governor Herbert O'Connor, who had signed the state's plead-
ings as attorney general during Murray's litigation with the uni-
versity. He was hired for his first position as a lawyer by the 
assistant attorney general who had argued the case against his 
admission to the law school.93 
The first of these suits to reach the Supreme Court was Mis-
souri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 94 in which Lloyd Lionel Gaines chal-
lenged his race-based exclusion from the University of Missouri 
law school.95 Gaines was an especially attractive plaintiff. He had 
an excellent scholastic record at Lincoln University, an all-black 
institution operated by Missouri. Thus, the state could not argue 
that he lacked the requisite qualifications for admission to the 
white law school without admitting that Lincoln was not equal to 
as well as separate from the University of Missouri.96 The state 
courts denied relief because Missouri had agreed to establish a 
law school for blacks in the future and meanwhile provided schol-
arships for them to attend law schools of comparable quality in 
adjacent states.97 Chief Justice Hughes, relying heavily upon the 
reasoning of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Murray and his 
own dicta in 1\1/cCabe, held that Gaines had the same personal 
right to a legal education within Missouri as did whites.98 The 
91. /d. at 486-87, 182 A. at 593. 
92. /d. at 487-89, 182 A. at 594. 
93. Record at 290-91. 
94. 305 U.S. 337 (1938), rev'g 342 Mo. 121, 113 S.W.2d 783 (1937). 
95. 305 U.S. at 342. 
96. See Kelleher, The Case of Lloyd Gaines: The Demise of the Separate But Equal Doctrine, 
56]. NEGRo HrsT. 262, 263-64 (1971). 
97. 342 Mo. at 132-34, 138-39, 113 S.W.2d at 788, 790-91. 
98. 305 U.S. at 351. 
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Court explained: 
The basic consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities 
other States provide, or whether they are as good as those in 
Missouri, but as to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes 
to white students and denies to negroes [sic] solely upon the 
ground of color. The admissibility of laws separating the races 
in the enjoyment of privileges afforded by the State rests wholly 
upon the equality of the privileges which the laws give to the 
separated groups within the State.99 
In the absence of a black law school, the state would have to en-
roll him in the otherwise all-white university. 100 
Justice McReynolds, in a dissentjoined by Justice Butler, sug-
gested that the Gaines decision would permit the state to "aban-
don her law school and thereby disadvantage her white citizens 
without improving petitioner's opportunities for legal instruc-
tion; or she may break down the settled practice concerning sepa-
rate schools and thereby, as indicated by experience, damnify 
both races." 101 He added that Missouri "has offered to provide 
the negro [sic] petitioner opportunity for the study of law-if 
perchance that is the thing really desired." 102 
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling, Missouri estab-
lished a law school for blacks at Lincoln University. Gaines failed 
to appear at the trial at which the equality of the two schools was 
to be assessed and was never seen again. 103 During the pendency 
99. !d. at 349. 
I 00. !d. at 352. 
101. 305 U.S. at 353 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 
217 (1971) (permitting city to close municipal swimming pools rather than desegregate 
them); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (allowing closing of whites-only city park on 
grounds that land had reverted by operation of state law to heirs of grantor following 
invalidation of racial restriction in will devising land to city). 
102. 305 U.S. at 353 (McReynolds,]., dissenting). The palpable implication was that 
Gaines was more interested in gaining sexual access to white women than in obtaining a 
law degree. In this regard, Justice McReynolds was reflecting the same social attitudes 
that were explicit in the Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion in Berea College and which 
traditionally have animated much racist ideology. See G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJ-
UDICE 349-55 (abridged ed. !958); B. BETTELHEIM & M. JANOWITZ, SOCIAL CHANGE AND 
PREJUDICE 150-51, 247-48, 287-88 (1964); T. GossETT, RACE: THE HisTORY oF AN IDEA 
IN AMERICA 270-73 (1965); C. HERNTON, SEX AND RACISM IN AMERICA (1966); T. PETTI-
GREW, A PROFILE OF THE NEGRO AMERICAN 139-40 (1964); C. STEMBAR, SEXUAL RACISM 
4-36 (1976). 
103. See Bluford, The Lloyd Gaines Story, 32 J. EDUC. Soc. 242, 245 (1959); Kelleher, 
supra note 96, at 267-68. 
There is an interesting side note to this story that involves Lucille Bluford herself. 
She served as executive editor of the Kansas City Call. She received her college degree 
with the aid of one of Missouri's out-of-state scholarships for blacks, then applied to the 
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of his suit, Gaines obtained an M.A. in economics from the Uni-
versity of Michigan and worked in that state for a time before 
returning to St. Louis. 104 All of the rumors and theories sur-
rounding his disappearance remain unverified to this day. 105 
While Gaines has been characterized as an "enormous mile-
stone,"106 its significance was far from clear after Sipuel v. Board of 
Regents. 107 The case was virtually on all fours with Gaines. 108 Ada 
Sipuel, the plaintiff, was an honor graduate of Langston Univer-
sity, an Oklahoma state college for blacks that offered no gradu-
ate or professional training of any kind. 109 She was excluded 
from the University of Oklahoma law school due to her race. In a 
per curiam opinion issued only four days after oral argument, the 
Court ordered Oklahoma to provide her with a legal education 
"in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of 
any other group." 110 
The state responded by converting a section of its capitol 
building to serve as the Langston law school. 111 Sipuel at-
tempted to challenge this response by filing an original action for 
mandamus in the Supreme Court. The Court concluded that its 
earlier decision had not addressed the issue of the constitutional 
adequacy of separate educational institutions. Accordingly, it 
could not now consider the method of compliance with the origi-
nal order. 112 
The Sipuel case had a happier outcome than did Gaines. Mter 
University of Missouri journalism school. Upon her exclusion from the school on racial 
grounds, she filed suit, raising the same basic issues as had Gaines. Bluford v. Canada, 
32 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo. 1940), appeal dismissed, 119 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1941). The 
state thereupon opened a journalism school at Lincoln, a school that she refused to 
attend. See Kelleher, supra note 96, at 269-70. 
104. Kelleher, supra note 96, at 268. 
105. See Clayton, The Strange Disappearance of Lloyd cm:nes, EBONY, May 1951, at 26, 27. 
106. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 213. 
107. 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam), rev'g 199 Okla. 586, 190 P.2d 437 (per 
curiam), motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied sub nom. Fisher v. Hurst, 
333 u.s. 147 (1948). 
108. See 332 U.S. at 632. 
109. See G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 65; Hubbell, The Desegregation of the University of 
Oklahoma, 1946-1950, 57 J. NEGRO HrsT. 370, 371 (1972). 
110. 332 U.S. at 633. The Court cited only Gaines in its brief order. 
Ill. See G. CROSS, supra note 20, at 52-54; R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 259; Hubbell, 
supra note 109, at 374. 
112. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 150 (1948) (per curiam). This procedural disposi-
tion of the matter promptedjustices Murphy and Rutledge to file dissents. !d. at 151. 
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refusing to enroll in the makeshift black law school, 113 the plain-
tiff ultimately was admitted to the previously all-white University 
of Oklahoma law school in June 1949. Except for internal state-
imposed segregation similar to that which ultimately was invali-
dated in one of the companion cases to Sweatt, 114 she apparently 
encountered no unusual difficulties. 115 She received her degree 
in 1951 and practiced law with an Oklahoma City firm before re-
turning to Langston as an administrator in 1956. Subsequently, 
she joined the faculty there and chaired the social sciences de-
partment for many years. 116 
Ultimately, the Langston law school went out of existence on 
June 30, 1949, having enrolled just one student. 117 By contrast, 
the black law school established in response to Gaines lasted four 
years and produced several members of the bar. 118 But the 
message of the Supreme Court was profoundly ambivalent: it 
seemed that blacks had no enforceable right to attend all-white 
public universities if the state provided any sort of alternative 
education. 
As Sweatt began making its way through the Texas courts, 
"separate but equal" appeared to be the law of the land. Segre-
gation was not yet equated with discrimination. Only if a state 
failed to provide a separate facility within its own borders would 
the judiciary interfere. Even then, however, there probably 
113. Following the Supreme Court's refusal in Fisher v. Hurst to order the desegrega-
tion of the University of Oklahoma, her lawyers filed suit in state court claiming that the 
"overnight" Langston law school was not equal to the white school. At trial, Professor 
Henry H. Foster of the University of Oklahoma, a native of the state, called the over-
night school "a fake, fraud, and deception." G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 81-82; Hubbell, 
supra note 109, at 374. More restrained criticisms of the inadequacies of Langston came 
from Professors Walter Gellhorn of Columbia, Max Radin of the University of Califor-
nia, and Charles Bunn of the University ofWisconsin and from Deans Erwin Griswold of 
Harvard and Earl G. Harrison of the University of Pennsylvania. The state court, ruling 
the social and economic effects of segregation irrelevant, refused to admit testimony by 
Robert C. Weaver, Dean Charles Thompson of the Howard University graduate school, 
and Robert Redfield, chairman of the anthropology department at the University of Chi-
cago. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 83; Hubbell, supra note I 09, at 374 n.22. 
114. See infra notes 231-235 and accompanying text. 
115. See Report of the First Negro Student to Enter the Law School, University of 
Oklahoma, Brief for the Texas Council of Negro Organizations as Amicus Curiae, App. 
D, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Texas Council Amicus 
Brief]; G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 113-14, 116-17. 
116. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 134. 
117. /d. at 114; Hubbell, supra note 109, at 378. 
118. See Kelleher, supra note 96, at 270. 
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would not be a very rigorous analysis of the equality of the segre-
gated institutions. 119 This result followed from the judicial con-
ception of education as a matter primarily of state and local 
concern, a conception reflected in the Court's resolution of other 
educational issues over the previous century and a half. 
B. Other Education Decisions 
I. The Early Cases.-Not until 1906, in Speer v. Colbert, 120 did a 
true educational issue reach the Supreme Court. Even then, the 
principal question was the validity of a bequest to Georgetown 
University to support research in colonial history. 121 After dis-
posing of various procedural and interpretive issues, 122 Justice 
Peckham rejected the challenger's argument that the school's 
charter did not authorize the university to accept the gift. He 
reasoned that Georgetown was empowered to instruct its stu-
dents in the liberal arts and sciences and that " '[t]he cultivation 
of historical research would seem to be a part of a liberal 
education.' " 123 
More typical of the early cases was the first, and perhaps the 
most celebrated, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 124 
Chief Justice Marshall began by observing that "education is an 
object of national concern and a proper subject oflegislation," 125 
and the underlying controversy involved important questions re-
119. There were, however, some cases suggesting increased judicial sensitivity to ra-
cial discrimination. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (barring judicial en-
forcement of racially restrictive covenants in the District of Columbia); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (barring state judicial enforcement of racially restrictive 
covenants); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (holding unconstitutional a state 
law prohibiting Japanese aliens from owning land); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 
(1944) (holding white primaries conducted by political party unconstitutional); see also 
supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. 
120. 200 u.s. 130 (1906). 
121. !d. at 133-34. 
122. The bequest was not void for misnomer (the testator had devised to Ge-
orgetown University, while the school had been incorporated as Georgetown College) 
since the bequest clearly was intended for this particular institution. ld. at 141-43. The 
gift also included a provision for a medical scholarship. The Court rejected a claim that 
its terms were too indefinite to enforce, pointing to the conditions contained in the will. 
ld. at 146-47. Neither was the bequest void for conflict with a statute barring such gifts 
to sectarian institutions since Georgetown was open to students of all faiths and did not 
aim to propagate any particular religious creed. !d. at 143-44. 
123. ld. at 145 (quoting 24 App. D.C. 187, 204 (1904)). 
124. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
125. ld. at 634. 
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specting political and religious control over higher education. 126 
Nevertheless, the litigation concerned the meaning of the con-
tract clause of the Constitution. 127 The trustees challenged a set 
of amendments to the college charter which substantially in-
creased the power of the State of New Hampshire over the insti-
tution's affairs. 128 The Court determined that the charter was a 
contract which the state had impaired by its amendments. 129 The 
most important legal proposition in the decision, however, may 
have been the suggestion made explicitly by Justice Story and im-
plicitly by Chief Justice Marshall that states could reserve the 
power to amend corporate charters. 130 
Similarly, in Head v. University of Missouri, 131 a mathematics 
r.rnf'<>cc£"\r rhaJJpngPrl <1 st<>tlltP th<>t rl1srhargPrl thP PiltlTP llnlVPT-p.l \.JL'--..3'-'\.J.L '-..l.l. .1..1.'-J.A '-'-"' L-' .._,_.,.._.._....._.._ o...aaii.A '-"''"' .._.._... '-'-4 o....o..a..._ .._. .&1,..&.& "'-- .......,..._ ........ y .._ ... 
sity faculty in the middle of his term of appointment and set up a 
new board of curators. The new board promptly hired a new 
mathematician. 132 The Court viewed the matter as a simple con-
tract question. The professor had accepted the position "subject 
to law." Thus, his employment was terminable at the will of the 
legislature. 133 Moreover, Head could hardly claim to have been 
surprised by the faculty purge. He had been hired as a replace-
ment after a prior statute had dismissed all of the incumbent in-
structional staff. 134 Nowhere did the Court express the slightest 
interest in the consequences of the instability of the faculty for 
the university or for its students. 135 
126. See generally Campbell, Dm·tmouth College as a Civil Liberties Case: The Fonnation of 
Constitutional Policy, 70 KY. LJ. 643, 666-95 (1982). 
127. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
128. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 626. 
129. !d. at 651-53. 
130. !d. at 708, 712 (Story,]., concurring); see also id. at 638 (opinion of the Court); cJ. 
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1908) (explicit right of amendment re-
served in charter permits state to prohibit instruction of racially mixed groups). 
131. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 526 (1873). 
132. The plaintiff had been selected for a six-year term. Slightly over three years 
later the legislature took the action which gave rise to this suit. !d. at 530. 
133. !d. at 530-31. 
134. !d. at 531. 
135. It is not at all clear that Head would come out differently today. As the Court 
explained in a seminal modern due process case involving the dismissal of an untenured 
professor at a state university, a public employee is entitled to a pretermination hearing 
only if the employment implicates a liberty or property interest. A liberty interest arises 
if the government publishes information about a discharged employee that might jeop-
ardize that person's good name or reputation. A property interest is "a legitimate claim 
of entitlement" arising from "an independent source such as state law" rather than from 
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Therefore, the significance of Speer should not be exagger-
ated. While it contained the first discussion of educational phi-
losophy that was not dictum, the Court applied minimum 
scrutiny to the practice at issue. In this sense, the decision fol-
lowed the traditional notion of education as a state and local mat-
ter. The NAACP attorneys in Sweatt, then, could not rely upon 
the case as a predicate for forcing close judicial inquiry into the 
quality of segregated law schools. 
2. Freedom of contract and substantive due process. -Some dicta 
by Justice Holmes a year later implied that upon a sufficiently 
strong showing, a plaintiff might overturn a state educational 
policy on constitutional grounds. 136 The hint was equivocal at 
best, however, 137 and was quickly forgotten in the era of substan-
tive due process. 138 Indeed, that theory provided the basis for 
the Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 577 (1972). That legiti-
mate claim of entitlement may arise from "mutually explicit understandings" even in the 
absence of a controlling state statute. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). 
It is unlikely that Head could have prevailed on any procedural due process claim. 
Unless the curators published potentially derogatory information about him, he could 
not assert the deprivation of a liberty interest. The mere fact of discharge from public 
employment does not call into question an individual's good name or reputation. 
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1976). And while recent cases make clear that 
procedural protections for property interests are a matter of federal law, Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1492-93 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush 
Co., 455 U.S. 422,432 (1982); Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480,491 (1981), Head could not 
demonstrate any basis in state law for asserting a property interest that would trigger 
those protections. 
Head could not have overturned his dismissal on substantive grounds unless he 
could show that it was based upon an impermissible reason. There is no indication, 
however, that he had been fired in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights or 
for any other prohibited reason. Cf Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival 
of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SuP. CT. REv. 261, 282 n.ll2 (despite losing on proce-
dural due process claim, Professor Roth was ultimately awarded compensatory and pu-
nitive damages of $6,746 on grounds that he had been terminated for reasons that 
violated the first amendment). 
136. Interstate Consol. St. Rv. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 86-88 (1907). In this 
case, the transit company challe~ged a statute requiring that it transport school children 
at half price. After finding that the regulation had taken effect before the company be-
gan operations and rejecting the challenge on this ground, id. at 84-85, Holmes noted 
the public importance of education and the latitude that the states enjoyed under the 
police power to promote it. !d. at 87-88. 
137. Id at 87 (suggesting that the fourteenth amendment must allow states "a certain 
latitude in the minor adjustments of life, even though by their action the burdens of a 
part of the community are somewhat increased"). 
138. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 
236 U.S. I (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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the first decisions holding state education regulations invalid, 
and Justice Holmes dissented from them. 
In N!eyer v. Nebraska 139 and Bartels v. Iowa, 140 teachers of Ger-
man challenged state laws prohibiting instruction in foreign lan-
guages. 141 Justice McReynolds found an obvious interference 
with the rights of the teachers to teach, of pupils to learn, and of 
parents to control the education of their children, an interference 
not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. 142 
Although the opinion contains stirring language emphasizing the 
importance of education, 143 the case turned on two narrow 
points of law. First, the statutes interfered with freedom of con-
tract. 144 Second, at least two of the legislative regulations were 
arbitrary in that they appiied only to the teaching of certain for-
eign languages. 145 
139. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
140. 262 u.s. 404 (1923). 
141. Meyer involved a Nebraska statute which prohibited the teaching of any language 
other than English to any pupil who had not completed the eighth grade. Meyer, 262 
U.S. at 397. Bartels concerned three state laws. One was the same statute that gave rise 
to the Meyer case. Bartels, 262 U.S. at 411. The others were from Iowa and Ohio. The 
Iowa law barred instruction in any language other than English in secular subjects, ex-
cept that schools could teach foreign languages to students who had gone beyond eighth 
grade. Ohio simply forbade instruction in German of pupils below eighth grade. !d. at 
409-10. 
In !11eyer, an Evangelical Lutheran parochial school teacher was convicted of using a 
collection of biblical stories in German while teaching a 10-year-old. 262 U.S. at 396-97. 
The consolidated cases in Bartels involved similar facts. In the first, an Iowa parochial 
school teacher was convicted of teaching his pupils to read German. In the second, two 
Ohio parochial school teachers likewise were convicted of teaching the German lan-
guage to primary school pupils. In the third, the Nebraska District of the Missouri 
Synod of the Lutheran Church sought to enjoin state and local officials from enforcing 
Nebraska's language law against church schools. See Bartels, 262 U.S. at 409-11. 
142. Me}el·, 262 U.S. at 401, 402-03. Bartels was decided the same day and on the 
authority of Meyer. 262 U.S. at 409. 
143. Justice McReynolds observed that "[t]he American people have always regarded 
education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should 
be diligently promoted." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. He illustrated this point by quoting 
from the Northwest Ordinance. !d. He then went on to quote from Plato on the public 
importance of education. !d. at 401-02. 
144. On freedom of contract, Justice McReynolds wrote: 
Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as 
harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desira-
ble. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. 
His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct 
their children, we think, are within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment. 
!d. at 400. 
145. The Ohio statute applied only to the teaching of German. See supra note 141. 
The Nebraska courts had construed their statute as applying only to modern languages. 
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Two years later, the Court struck down an Oregon law requir-
ing that all children between the ages of eight and sixteen attend 
public schools. Applying his !Vfeyer rationale in Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 146 Justice McReynolds found the statute "arbitrary, unrea-
sonable and unlawful." 147 Once again, he recognized the social 
significance of education, noting that the case did not present 
any issue as to the power of the state to require school attend-
ance or to establish minimum qualifications for teachers or cur-
ricular coverage. 148 As in Meyer, he went on to underscore the 
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children. 149 
The states lacked power "to standardize [their] children by forc-
ing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 150 
While this statement might be taken as an endorsement of the 
value of educational diversity and the benefits of competition in 
the academic sphere, it more likely reflects the Court's general 
hostility to government regulation of social and economic mat-
ters. This interpretation is supported by the Court's emphasis 
upon the threatened destruction of the business and property of 
the operators of private and parochial schools. 151 
Thus, these decisions suggested that in a proper case the 
Court would scrutinize educational policies with some care. 
They could not provide Sweatt with grounds for much optimism, 
however. For one thing, the substantive due process-freedom of 
contract mode of jurisprudence, upon which they rested, had 
fallen into disrepute. 152 For another, the author of these opin-
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01. Justice Holmes dissented in both cases, noting that a state 
reas_onably might decide to require instruction only in English for primary students in 
the t~terest of promoting the use of a common tongue. Bartels, 262 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, 
J., dtssenting). Nevertheless, he concurred in the result in the Ohio case because he 
viewed the special provision for German as impermissible. Id. at 4l3. 
146. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
147. Id. at 536. · 
148. ld. at 534. 
149. ld. at 534-35. 
150. Id. at 535. 
15 1. . The plaintiffs were a religious order and a private corporation which operated 
parochtal and military schools. Id. at 531-33. Beyond their business and property inter-
~sts, they were permitted to assert the rights of parents and pupils affected by the state 
aw. ld. at 535-36; cf. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (enjoining enforce-
lent of territorial law imposing detailed regulations upon private schools conducted in 
dapanese and other foreign languages on grounds that implementation probably would 
e;~roy the schools, resulting in a deprivation of property without due process of law). 
p ~2 · See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. lOO (1940); United States v. Carolene 
ro s. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); 
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ions had written an icy dissent in Gaines suggesting that the type 
of racial classification at issue in Sweatt posed no constitutional 
problems, 153 and the ultimate outcome in Sipuel seemed to con-
firm that view. 
3. The religion clauses.-At the same time, a parallel line of 
cases implied the development of increasing judicial sensitivity to 
the relationship of religion to education. Not surprisingly, the 
Court began cautiously, refusing to disturb federal payments for 
sectarian Indian schools 154 and state provision of textbooks to 
parochial as well as public school pupils. 155 
The decision in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia 156 contained a more searching analysis, but the result was the 
same. Several college freshmen were suspended after they re-
fused to enroll in a required ROTC course because of their reli-
gious beliefs. 157 The Court rejected each of their arguments. 
First, the university regulation did not violate the privileges and 
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment since the privi-
lege of attending the institution came from the state, not a fed-
eral entity .158 Second, the students had no due process right to 
exemption from military training. 159 Third, the ROTC require-
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
Then-Professor Frankfurter, while applauding the spirit of toleration promoted by 
the result in Pierce, criticized the substantive due process rationale underlying it as a cost 
"on the whole ... greater than its gains.". Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, 43 
NEW REPUB. 85, 86 (1925), reprinted in F. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND PoLITICS 195, 197 
(1939); see also A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 25 (1970). 
153. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
154. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). 
155. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. ofEduc., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). 
156. 293 u.s. 245 (1934). 
157. The plaintiffs were sons of clergymen whose churches had petitioned to have 
their members exempted from all military training as conscientious objectors. At the 
start of the fall term, the students unsuccessfully sought to be excused from the ROTC 
requirement. They then refused to take the course and were suspended pursuant to a 
board of regents regulation. !d. at 250-56. The students offered to take any alternative 
course which the university proposed, but that offer was refused. !d. at 254. 
158. !d. at 261. In fact, the University of California had accepted benefits under the 
Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-05,307-08 (1982)). 
This in turn obligated the institution to offer some form of military training. The state, 
however, retained control of the details of that training. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 258-59. 
159. The Court found that conscientious objectors had no constitutional protection 
from military service or training, although Congress might provide exemptions by 
means of legislation. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 264. On the other hand, citizens owed the 
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ment did not conflict with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, under which 
the United States had renounced war as an instrument of na-
tional policy. 160 
More significantly, Hamilton rejected an argument that would 
be central in Sweatt: that the students had a unique interest in 
attending a particular institution. They claimed that the Univer-
sity of California had denied them the opportunity for higher ed-
ucation of a quality that was not available elsewhere except at 
prohibitive cost. 161 The majority dismissed this position as "un-
. tenable." 162 Justice Cardozo's concurrence suggested that the 
ROTC requirement might be "unwise or illiberal or unfair" as 
applied to conscientious objectors, but that alone did not raise a 
constitutional issue. 163 Thus, if a state effectively could exclude 
students from a university on the basis of their most fundamental 
religious beliefs, at least where those students might attend a less 
prestigious state college, perhaps a state also could exclude stu-
dents from one law school on the basis of their race where the 
state provided a less prestigious alternative within its own bor-
ders. The situations differ, of course, because race is immutable, 
whereas religious beliefs may not be. Moreover, the equality of 
any alternative institution was not at issue in Hamilton, whereas 
that was the fundamental question in Sweatt. Nevertheless, such a 
conclusion followed from the logic of Gaines and Sipuel. 
Certain post-Hamilton developments, however, implied that 
the Court was becoming increasingly sensitive to the integrity of 
the educational process. In particular, West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette 164 held a compulsory flag salute regulation 
unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. 165 Justice 
Jackson found the "delicate" responsibility of school officials to 
gove_rnment, which had the responsibility to maintain peace and order, the duty of de-
fendmg it against all enemies. ld. at 262. 
160. ld. at 265. 
161. Id. at 254. 
162. ld. at 262. 
163. ld. at 266 (Cardozo, J., joined by Brandeis & Stone, JJ., concurring). Justice 
C_ardozo pointed out that military instruction did not constitute an establishment of reli-
gl_on, and absent a pledge of subsequent military service there could be no interference 
With free exercise. Moreover, conscientious objectors historically had been recognized 
~s. an act of grace, but often with conditions more onerous than those at issue in this 
ltlgation. !d. at 266-67. 
164. 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
165. Id. at 642. 
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"educat[e] the young for citizenship ... reason for scrupulous 
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are 
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere plati-
tudes."166 This conclusion required the overruling of !V!inersville 
School District v. Gobitis, 167 a precedent of only three years' stand-
ing. Justice Frankfurter, who dissented vigorously in Barnette, 168 
had expressed similar concerns in Gobitis but felt that the Court 
should abjure judicial resolution of the competing policy ques-
tions lest it become "the school board of the country." 169 
While the flag salute cases involved special dispensation for 
religious believers, two others decided while Sweatt was making 
its way through the state courts dealt with affirmative assistance 
to church-related schools. In Everson v. Board of Education, 170 a 
closely divided Court upheld a system of partial reimbursement 
of the transportation costs of public and parochial school stu-
dents.171 Noting the inherent tension between the establishment 
and free exercise clauses of the first amendment, the majority 
reasoned that the program served a public purpose and was neu-
tral as between believers and nonbelievers. 172 The four dissent-
ers, on the basis of their interpretation of the record, rejected 
both of these conclusions. 173 
The following year, in Illinois ex rel. !V!cCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 174 the Court had much less difficulty in finding released-time 
religious training unconstitutional. The program at issue permit-
ted sectarian instructors to offer students, while in school build-
ings during school hours, up to forty-five minutes of weekly 
instruction in the tenets of their faith. 175 Justice Black, who had 
166. Id. at 637. 
167. 310 u.s. 586 (1940). 
168. 319 U.S. at 646. 
169. 310 U.S. at 598. To this Justice Jackson replied, "The Fourteenth Amendment 
... protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Educa-
tion not excepted." 319 U.S. at 637. 
170. 330U.S.1 (1947). 
171. Id. at 3. 
172. Id. at 7, 16-18. 
173. !d. at 19-22 Qackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 50-52 (Rut-
ledge, J., joined by Frankfurter, Jackson & Burton, lJ ., dissenting). 
174. 333 u.s. 203 (1948). 
175. The program offered sectarian instruction to students in grades four through 
nine provided that their parents consented in writing. The teachers were members of 
the clergy and active lay congregants. !d. at 207-09. 
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written the prevailing opinion in Everson, saw this as direct aid to 
religion which the establishment clause prohibited. 176 While the 
difficulty of reconciling the two cases prompted several other 
opinions, only one Justice dissentedP7 
Despite the inconsistency of these decisions, which upheld the 
challenged practices as often as not, they reflected an underlying 
trend away from complete judicial deference to the views of edu-
. cators. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs' arguments received 
serious consideration. Their claims were sometimes rejected, 
but only because either the particular facts did not bring the 
plaintiffs within the rule for which they were contending178 or 
compelling policy concerns made relief inappropriate. 179 This 
trend suggested that the Court might reexamine the Plessy doc-
trine as applied to education. At the least, the refusal to review 
Oklahoma's compliance with Sipuel because that question had not 
been presented properly virtually compelled the conclusion that 
the Justices would clarify the meaning of equality. For that to 
happen, however, a litigant would have to make the necessary 
record. 
III. Making the Record 
Establishing either the unconstitutionality of segregation or 
the inequality of the two institutions in Sweatt would prove diffi-
cult. Texas not only had announced its intention to open a sepa-
rate law school for blacks, as Missouri had in Gaines,l 80 but had 
proceeded in apparent good faith to create a full-fledged "uni-
versity of the first class" in response to the plaintifFs application 
176. !d. at 210, 212. This decision does not undermine the argument that Sweatt 
marked the first time that the Court looked to the substance rather than the form of 
education. McCollum explicitly turns on the direct aid to religion. Thus, the Court fo-
cused on the form of the program, even though some members addressed substantive 
aspects of the matter. See 333 U.S. at 212 (opinion of Frankfurter, J., joined by Jackson, 
Rutledge & Burton, JJ.) . 
. _177. In addition to Justice Frankfurter's opinion, in which all oftheEverson dissenters 
Jomed, Justice Jackson concurred. Only Justice Reed dissented. 
178. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 6, 16-17; Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 261-65. 
179. See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598-99. 
180. Texas initially authorized the establishment of a law school at Prairie View Uni-
versity "[w]henever there is any demand for same .... " Act of June 1, 1945, ch. 308, 
§ 2, 1945 Tex. Gen. Laws 506 (repealed 1947). Similarly, the curators of Lincoln Uni-
versity had the right, "whenever necessary and practicable in their opinion," to establish 
an~ course of instruction. Mo. REv. STAT. § 9618 (1929) (repealed 1965), quoted in 
Games, 305 U.S. at 346 n.2. 
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to the white institution, as Oklahoma had not in Sipuel. 181 The 
board of directors of Texas State recruited faculty members vig-
orously and determined to obtain accreditation for the new law 
school as quickly as possible. 182 Thus, a victory in this litigation 
would have very broad implications. A defeat, on the other hand, 
would force the NAACP to litigate a potentially endless series of 
suits designed to equalize racially separate educational programs. 
Whether Sweatt sought a ruling that the Plessy doctrine had no 
place in the field of public education 183 or simply that Texas had 
not provided him with a satisfactory alternative forum for legal 
training, the result hinged on the definition of equality. The 
courts would have to compare The University of Texas law 
school with that of the new Texas State University for Negroes to 
determine whether they were identical, substantially equal, or 
substantially unequal. Even such seemingly objective factors as 
student-faculty ratio, class size, and library holdings might ra-
tionally be evaluated differently. To the extent that subjective 
criteria such as prestige and tradition entered the equation, the 
outcome became even less predictable. The lack of judicial ex-
pertise in educational administration, the difficulty of continuous 
monitoring of substantial equivalence, and the limits on equita-
ble powers to compel specific performance suggested the magni-
tude of the plaintiff's burden. 184 
An additional complication arose from the legislation estab-
lishing the new university, which authorized an interim law 
school in Austin pending the selection of a permanent site for the 
181. There was no Oklahoma Jaw school for blacks when Sipuel filed suit. See supra 
note 109 and accompanying text. Texas had authorized a black law school and in fact 
offered Sweatt a place in such an institution. See supra notes 17 & 27-33 and accompany-
ing text. 
182. In its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the school was "on the road to full 
accreditation." 339 U.S. at 633; 0. joHNSON, supra note 19, at 14-15, 49-50, 103-05, 
108-09. Ozie Johnson, the first full-time dean of the Texas State Jaw school, suggested 
that the establishment of the new university benefited black professors in general. The 
mere existence of a new institution committed to substantial equality with one of the 
nation's leading research universities stimulated increases in black faculty salaries 
throughout the South. !d. at 14-15. 
183. See Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954). 
184. See Leflar & Davis, supra note 39, at 393-96. For discussion of the range of fac-
tors which were litigated under the "separate but equal" doctrine, see D. BELL, supm 
note 39, at 368-71; Larson, supra note 39, at 482 n.27; Leflar & Davis, supra note 39, at 
403-04, 430-35. 
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entire institution. 185 At the time of the state court hearing on the 
equality of the separate facilities, only the temporary black law 
school had begun operations. 186 The interim Texas State school, 
located in an office building across the street from the state capi-
tol, was of course unaccredited. Its faculty consisted of three jun-
ior professors from The University of Texas, all of whom 
maintained their offices and teaching responsibilities on the 
white campus. The dean, registrar, and librarian of the white 
school served in the same capacities at the black school. Except 
for a handful of books on hand and about 10,000 volumes on 
order, Texas State had no library; its students were to have ac-
cess to the Texas Supreme Court library on the second floor of 
the capitol. 187 The school opened with an enrollment of two, not 
including Heman Marion Sweatt, who refused to attend. 188 By 
contrast, Texas had a nationally distinguished law school. It had 
a faculty of sixteen full- and three part-time professors, a library 
of 65,000 volumes, a law review, moot court, other extracurricu-
lar activities, and a large corps of prominent alumni to serve its 
850 students. 189 
The trial on the question of the equality of the two law 
schools presented an unusual public debate on educational phi-
losophy between prominent legal academics. Thurgood Mar-
shall, chief counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and head 
of the team of attorneys representing Sweatt, relied upon Earl G. 
Harrison, dean of the University of Pennsylvania law school, and 
Malcolm P. Sharp, professor of law at the University of Chi-
cago.190 Texas Attorney General Price Daniel, who personally 
tried the case for the state, depended upon the testimony of 
185. ActofMarch3, 1947,supranote30, § 11. 
186. 210 S.W.2d at 446. By the time of the appeal to the Supreme Court, the perma-
nent Texas State law school had opened in Houston. 339 U.S. at 633. 
187. 339 U.S. at 633; 210 S.W.2d at 448-50. 
188. 210 S.W.2d at 446; 0. joHNSON, supra note l9, at 13. The permanent Texas 
State law school had five full-time professors, 23 students, a 16,500-volume library with 
a full-time staff, a moot court, and legal aid facilities by the time of the Supreme Court 
decision. 339 U.S. at 633. In addition, its first alumnus had become a member of the 
Texas bar. Id. 
189. 339 U.S. at 632-33. 
190. This was not the only time during this period that Marshall had brought in aca-
de~ic experts to testify against segregation. In Sipuel his witnesses included Dean Erwin 
Gnswold of Harvard and Professors Max Radin of the University of California, Walter 
Gellhorn of Columbia, and Charles Bunn of the University of Wisconsin, in addition to 
Dean Harrison and Professors Redfield and Thompson. See G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 
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Dean Charles T. McCormick and Professor A.W. Walker, Jr., of 
The University of Texas. 
The most basic contrast between the two schools concerned 
physical arrangements. The University ofTexas law school occu-
pied an entire building that had been designed for the purpose, 
whereas the Texas State law school was located on the bottom 
floor of an office building. 191 The white school had three class-
rooms to serve its 850 students, while the black school had two 
classrooms to serve its projected enrollment of ten. Moreover, 
the Texas law school building was severely overcrowded, accom-
modating approximately twice as many students as originally 
planned. 192 Thus, according to Dean McCormick, Texas State 
had "at least equal and probably superior facilities for the study 
oflaw." 193 He conceded, however, that he meant equal in quality 
rather than equal in size. 194 
Similarly, Dean McCormick admitted that Texas State stu-
dents would have to use the Supreme Court library across the 
street from the school until the arrival of the books that had been 
ordered. Of course, The University of Texas library had a larger 
collection, and one assembled for use by students and scholars 
rather than by practitioners and judges. Still, the two facilities 
were at least arguably equal in that the court library offered more 
space per student than the "exceedingly crowded" university 
library. 195 
Other aspects of the two schools were identical. For example, 
both followed the same curriculum and imposed the same admis-
80-81, 83; R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 258; Hubbell, supra note 109, at 374 & n.22; see also 
supra note 113. 
191. The precise characterization of the floor which the interim Texas State law 
school occupied was a source of controversy throughout the proceedings. At trial, 
Sweatt's lawyers consistently referred to it as the basement. See, e.g., Record at 88-89, 
350. Dean McCormick described it as the first floor, but he conceded that it was four or 
five steps below the level of the sidewalk. Record at 88. In the Supreme Court, 
Thurgood Marshall referred to Texas State as a "basement law school." 18 U.S.L.W. 
3280 (1950) (summary of oral argument); Brief for Petitioner at 71. 
192. Record at 76-79 (testimony of Dean McCormick). 
193. Record at 109. 
194. Record at 110. 
195. Record at 79. Dean McCormick also recognized that the 10,000 volumes des-
tined for the Texas State library would not fit on the single floor of the building in which 
the black school was located. He pointed out, however, that the institution had an op-
tion to take over all of the remaining space as needed. Record at 89. 
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sion requirements. 196 In addition, the instructors in the first-se-
mester courses at Texas State were teaching the same courses 
simultaneously at Texas. 197 Thus, all applicants would be equally 
qualified; once enrolled, students would at least in theory learn 
common subjects from a common faculty. 
In short, there were some obvious differences in physical re-
sources and facilities between Texas and Texas State. If that 
were the crux of the dispute, however, the Sweatt case would have 
been a lot simpler. Whatever the physical differences between 
the two law schools, it was not at all clear that they were unequal 
in a legal sense. Precisely because the argument based upon 
physical disparities was ambiguous, Marshall devoted most of his 
case to establishing the existence of more subtle qualitative dif-
ferences between the two schools. Most of this aspect of the trial 
focused upon the effects of the much smaller class size at Texas 
State. 
Even these intangible factors lent themselves to conflicting in-
terpretations, however. Dean McCormick and Professor Walker, 
for example, emphasized that small classes presented unusual 
opportunities for personal instruction. 198 Thus, "[i]n a class of 
ten, all of the students are on their toes all the time, because they 
realize they are apt to be called upon next." 199 Marshall's ex-
perts noted that Sweatt had been the only black law school appli-
cant when Texas State was created and condemned the 
minuscule class size projected for Texas State. Dean Harrison 
said that it would be "mistaken, even absurd, to speak of any in-
stitution that has one student as a law school. " 200 Professor 
Sharp emphasized that even if ten students enrolled, the new 
school could not offer an education equal to that provided at 
Texas.2ot 
These professors concentrated on what they regarded as the 
most important shortcomings of Texas State. First, racially re-
strictive enrollment policies would deny its students the benefits 
196. Record at 81-82, 84. 
197. Record at 84, 113. All three professors were in their first year of law teaching. 
Record at 93. 
198. Record at 117 (testimony of Dean McCormick); Record at 305-06,314 (testi-
mony of Professor Walker). 
199. Record at 306 (testimony of Professor Walker). 
200. Record at 216-17. 
201. Record at 343. 
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of interchange and association with a community that reflected 
the diverse viewpoints and experiences of the general popu-
lace.202 Second, the extremely small size of the class would pre-
vent effective instruction in the case method203 and the 
maintenance of a law review, moot court, full-time faculty, and 
other indicia of an outstanding law school. 204 Third, the com-
plete absence of upperclassmen during Sweatt's first year would 
deny him important educational benefits, a loss that would defeat 
his personal right to legal training equal to that provided at The 
University of Texas. 205 By whatever criteria, then, the two 
schools were not equal. 
The trial also featured a clash of views on segregated educa-
tion. On this issue, Marshall called Robert Redfield, a lawyer and 
chairman of the anthropology department at the University of 
Chicago. For its part, the state called Benjamin F. Pittenger, who 
recently had retired as dean of education at The University of 
Texas. Professor Redfield emphasized that segregation inter-
fered with the learning process in several ways. First, compelled 
separation prevented students from meeting and learning about 
members of the groups from which they were isolated. Second, 
segregation engendered racial suspicion and distrust. Education 
for all would be enhanced in an environment that was broadly 
representative of the total community.206 He recognized that 
202. Record at 197, 200, 226-27 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 341-42, 
348-53 (testimony of Professor Sharp). 
203. Record at 216-18,225-26 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 342-43 (testi-
mony of Professor Sharp). 
204. Record at 220-23 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 355-57 (testimony of 
Professor Sharp). 
Dean McCormick testified that the absence of these programs from Texas State was 
not significant at the time of trial because none was open to first-year students. Record 
at 104-07, 112. Indeed, he characterized these activities as "minor and extraneous." 
Record at 106. Professor Walker agreed with respect to the absence of a law review. 
Record at 316. Dean McCormick suggested, however, that a law review might be estab-
lished as part of "the natural evolution of a well-conducted law school." Record at 107. 
Both Dean Harrison and Professor Sharp emphasized that the existence of a law 
review helped to create incentives for academic excellence for all students. Record at 
221 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 347 (testimony of Professor Sharp). In-
deed, Professor Sharp maintained that the law review is "[o]ne of the most important" 
elements of legal education because its existence "sets the tone" of the entire institu-
tion. Record at 34 7. 
205. Record at 219 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 34 7 (testimony of Pro-
fessor Sharp). 
206. Record at 194-95, 197. 
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some forms of segregation could not be eliminated immediately. 
Nevertheless, laws requiring segregation could "be changed 
quickly."207 In particular, "in every community there is some 
segregation that can be changed at once, and the area of higher 
education is the most favorable for making the change. " 208 
Dean Pittenger, on the other hand, contended that blacks 
could receive a substantially equal education in separate colleges 
and universities. He based his conclusion, in large measure, 
upon the view that blacks would have a better overall experience 
in a segregated institution; they would find more opportunities to 
participate in extracurricular activities and to develop leadership 
skills.209 Underlying his position, however, was a concern for the 
effects of desegregation upon public schools more generally. He 
could not see how segregation, once breached at the university 
level, could be maintained in the elementary and secondary 
grades. If these classes were integrated, Dean Pittenger feared 
for the future of white support for the public schools: 
I think it is reasonable to believe that at the present time the 
attitude of Texas people being what it is to a very considerable 
degree, that the effect of the abandonment of segregation on 
the lower level would set back the public school movement in 
this state, and as one who has devoted his life to an attempt to 
improve it, I can't regard that with equanimity.210 
He also thought it unlikely that whites would accept the assign-
ment of the many black teachers who staffed segregated schools 
to mixed classrooms. This would deprive many black profession-
als of their livelihood. Moreover, since many black college grad-
uates pursued teaching careers, desegregation ultimately might 
discourage younger blacks from seeking higher education for 
fear that they would be unemployable.211 
207. Record at 198. 
208. Record at 199. 
209. Record at 323-25. 
210. Record at 327. Dean Pittenger further explained 
that it would become ... a bonanza to the private white schools of the State, 
and that it would mean the migration out of the schools and the turning away 
from the public schools of the influence and support of a large number of chil-
dren and of the parents of those children .... 
Now, the south has had to fight against the private school tradition since 
the beginning .... [T]he fight for public education in this State has been to a 
very large extent the matter of the converting of people with that background 
to the support of public schools, and to the patronage of public schools. 
Record at 326. 
211. Record at 326-27. 
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To buttress his arguments against segregated schooling, Mar-
shall also tendered testimony from Charles H. Thompson, dean 
of the graduate school at Howard University and editor of the 
Journal of Negro Education, concerning disparities between black 
and white colleges in Texas and from Donald G. Murray, the suc-
cessful plaintiff in the University of Maryland case that had pre-
ceded Gaines, 212 concerning his experience as the first black 
student at that institution.213 The trial court permitted both wit-
nesses to testify in order to afford a complete record on appeal 
but ultimately refused to consider their evidence in reaching its 
decision.214 
The significance of Marshall's trial strategy cannot be exag-
gerated. By focusing upon the benefits of integrated education 
and upon the suspicion and intolerance engendered by segrega-
tion, he sought for the first time to move the legal debate away 
from preoccupation with the purely physical differences in the 
separate facilities provided for whites and blacks. Perhaps he did 
so out of concern that the purely physical differences between the 
two schools were not great enough to constitute inequality under 
the Plessy doctrine. In a larger sense, however, this novel ap-
proach harkened back to the point of Justice Harlan's dissent in 
that case: whites had imposed segregation because they re-
garded blacks as subhuman beings who were unfit to participate 
in civilized society. The equality of the separate facilities was en-
tirely irrelevant to this overriding precept, the truth of which 
Harlan said no one would be so wanting in candor as to deny. 
Yet for half a century American society had denied it. 
The Texas courts were no different. The trial court focused 
upon the state's moral and financial commitment to an entirely 
new institution offering "substantially equal facilities" and hav-
ing identical entrance, curricular, and graduation requirements, 
as well as the same faculty and courses as those provided at The 
University of Texas. Accordingly, Sweatt "would be afforded 
212. Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936). For discussion of this case, 
see supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. 
213. Record at 228-86 (testimony of Dean Thompson); Record at 287-91 (testimony 
of Murray). 
214. The court considered Dean Thompson's testimony only as it compared the 
Texas State program with that of The University of Texas. The judge rejected his evi-
dence concerning other institutions in the state. The court ruled Murray's testimony 
inadmissible in its entirety. 210 S.W.2d at 446. 
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equal if not better opportunities for the study of law in [the] sep-
arate school" at Texas State.215 Thus, he had suffered no cogni-
zable injury as a result of his exclusion from the white university. 
Nevertheless, the record had been made. 
This record did not impress the Court of Civil Appeals, which 
affirmed the judgment. That court first refused to consider the 
constitutional validity of "separate but equal" education on the 
basis of an "unbroken line" of United States Supreme Court de-
cisions upholding segregation.216 Any claim that separate 
schools were inherently discriminatory, at least at the graduate 
and professional level, was "predicated upon a purely abstract 
and theoretical hypothesis, wholly unrelated to reality."217 Since 
this case dealt with the world with all its imperfections rather 
than some hypothetical ideal state, the trial court had correctly 
applied the test of "substantial" rather than "absolute" equality. 
The testimony of Professor Redfield and the other experts on the 
harmful effects of separate schools likewise addressed the wis-
dom rather than the constitutionality of the state's policy of seg-
regation.218 The evidence demonstrated "an enormous outlay 
both in funds and in carefully and conscientiously planned and 
executed endeavor, in a sincere and bona fide effort to afford 
every reasonable and adequate facility and opportunity" to 
Sweatt for the study of law in a separate but equal public 
institution.219 
When the Texas Supreme Court denied review,220 the case 
was on its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. This 
time, Marshall made certain that the Justices would reach the 
merits. He presented only one question for review: "May the 
State of Texas Consistently With the Requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment Refuse to Admit [Sweatt] Because of Race 
and Color to the University of Texas School of Law?"221 
215. Sweatt v. Painter, No. 74,945 (126th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., June 17, 
1947) (unpublished), Record at 440. 
216. 210 S.W.2d at 444 & n.l. 
217. !d. at 445. 
218. /d. 
219. /d. at 44 7. 
220. Sweatt v. Painter, No. A-1695 (Tex. Sept. 29, 1948). 
221. Petition for Certiorari at 13. 
!tnr 
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IV. The Supreme Court Proceedings 
A. The !Vfaking of a Trilogy 
[Vol. 5:3 
The petition for certiorari was filed on March 23, 1949.222 
The Court took no immediate action on the petition and held it 
over to the term beginning in October. 223 Review was ultimately 
granted on November 7. 224 As if to underscore its significance, 
the Court scheduled Sweatt for consideration simultaneously with 
two other important civil rights cases, Henderson v. United States 225 
and JvfcLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education. 226 
Both cases involved the physical isolation of blacks who were ad-
mitted to facilities open to whites. While these cases appear easy 
in retrospect, in both instances the lower courts had upheld 
segregation. 
In Henderson, a black government employee was denied dining 
car service by the Southern Railway while traveling on official 
business. 227 A railroad rule required segregated seating in the 
dining car. Under the regulation, most of the tables were re-
served exclusively for whites; two were conditionally set aside for 
blacks. Those tables were available to white passengers if all of 
the remaining tables were occupied. When those tables were oc-
222. I7 U.S.L.W. 3290 (1949). 
223. See I7 U.S.L.W. 3379 (U.S. June 27, I949) (order carrying over all unresolved 
matters). It is not clear whether the Court delayed action on the petition out of reluc-
tance to address potentially explosive issues or due to Jack of time. See Hutchinson, 
Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmalling in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 CEo. L.J. I, 
I5 (1979). 
224. 338 u.s. 865 (1949). 
225. 339 U.S. 8I6 (1950). The Court wasted no time in setting this case for plenary 
consideration. The jurisdictional statement was filed on February I7, I949. 17 
U.S.L.W. 3276 (1949). The Court noted probable jurisdiction on March I4. 69 S. Ct. 
740 (1949). 
226. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). The Court delayed action on this case even longer than it 
did in Sweatt. The jurisdictional statement was filed on March I, I949, I7 U.S.L.W. 3290 
(1949), but the noting of probable jurisdiction did not occur until November 7. 70 S. 
Ct. 139 (1949). The Court's lack of haste apparently arose from concern that the case 
may have become moot due to McLaurin's uncertain academic status at the end of his 
first semester at the University of Oklahoma. This issue was resolved when counsel as-
sured the Court that McLaurin was continuing his studies in good standing. See Hutch-
inson, supra note 223, at 15 n.I12. 
227. The incident in question occurred in May 1942. Elmer Henderson was a field 
representative of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices. He made 
his trip to investigate alleged incidents of discrimination in Alabama. Brief for the 
United States at 4, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 ( 1950) [hereinafter cited as 
Henderson Brief]. 
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cupied by blacks, a curtain was drawn to separate them from the 
white tables. Henderson went to the dining car three times in an 
unsuccessful effort to obtain a meal, but each time whites were 
sitting at the black tables. 228 Henderson filed a complaint with 
the Interstate Commerce Commission claiming that he had been 
subjected to "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvan-
tage" in violation of section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce 
Act. 229 The Commission rejected the complaint, and a divided 
three-judge court affirmed that ruling. 230 
The McLaurin case arose in the wake of Sipuel. George 
McLaurin, a senior professor at Langston University who wanted 
to obtain a doctorate, 231 was one of half a dozen other blacks who 
228. !d. at 3; Henderson, 339 U.S. at 818-20. 
229. Ch. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 379, 380 (1887) (renumbered § 3(1) by Transportation 
Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 405, 41 Stat. 456, 479) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1074l(b)-
(d) (1982)). 
230. Henderson, 339 U.S. at 820. The actual procedural history of the case is some-
what more complex than the account provided in the text. This complexity accounts for 
the eight-year interval between the railroad's refusal to serve Henderson and the 
Supreme Court decision. The Commission initially held that Henderson's treatment 
had violated the statute but attributed the incident to the bad judgment of an employee. 
Henderson v. Southern Ry., 258 I.C.C. 413, 419 (1944). A three-judge court set aside 
that ruling because the railroad's policy of reserving some tables exclusively for whites 
and others only conditionally for blacks resulted in unequal treatment of the races. The 
court remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. Henderson v. 
United States, 63 F. Supp. 906, 916 (D. Md. 1945) (three-judge court). Meanwhile, the 
railroad had changed its policy to reserve one table exclusively for blacks. When occu-
pied, however, that table was to be separated from the rest of the dining car by a drawn 
curtain; the railroad planned ultimately to install a five-foot partition to set off the black 
table. The Commission upheld this new policy. Henderson v. Southern Ry., 269 I.C.C. 
73 (l 94 7). The three-judge court, over a dissent by Judge Morris Soper, affirmed. Hen-
derson v. ICC, SO F. Supp. 32 (D. Md. 1948) (three-judge court). The majority reasoned 
that the new policy satisfied the requirements of "separate but equal" because, based 
upon the racial composition of the railroad's passenger traffic, proportionately fair ar-
rangements had been made for blacks and whites. !d. at 39. Judge Soper dismissed this 
point as irrelevant because the right to equal treatment applied to individuals rather 
than groups. Nothing in the new policy would assure Henderson of fair treatment in the 
same situation that gave rise to his complaint. !d. at 40, 42. 
231. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 65. McLaurin's precise age at the time is unclear. 
tv.Iarshall said he was 68. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 266. The president of the Univer-
Sity of Oklahoma reports that he was 54. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 85. However old 
he was, it was no accident that McLaurin rather than Ada Sipuel was selected to continue 
the challenge to segregated higher education in Oklahoma. Perhaps mindful of Justice 
Mc~eynolds' dissent in Gaines, see supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text, Marshall 
beheved that no one could plausibly claim that a man of McLaurin's age would be inter-
ested in intermarriage. R. KLUGER, supm note 7, at 266. 
M Ent.irely apart from that issue, there was a certain symmetry to the selection of 
cLaunn as the plaintiff. In 1923, his wife had been the first black to apply to the 
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applied to the graduate school of the University of Oklahoma 
early in 1948.232 A study committee established by the regents of 
the university recommended that blacks be admitted to graduate 
and professional programs in white institutions.233 The commit-
tee explained that creating new curricula for blacks in separate 
institutions could not be justified due to prohibitive cost and 
small projected demand. 234 Soon afterward, the legislature 
amended the segregation statutes to permit blacks to enroll in 
white colleges and universities to pursue programs not offered in 
black institutions. All instruction offered under this new law, 
however, was to be provided on a segregated basis. Pursuant to 
the statute, McLaurin was admitted but segregated within the 
university. At first he was required to sit in an anteroom adjoin-
ing his classrooms, at a designated desk in the library, and at a 
particular table in the cafeteria. Thereafter, he was assigned to a 
seat in a row of classroom desks set aside for nonwhites and to a 
desk on the main floor of the library. A three-judge district court 
rejected McLaurin's claim that these arrangements denied him 
equal protection.235 
B. The Arguments 
By the time Sweatt v. Painter reached the Supreme Court, its 
import had become apparent. The State of Texas filed a 118-
page brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari, while its 
brief on the merits ran 235 pages; both of these documents con-
University of Oklahoma. Not surprisingly, she was rejected on racial grounds due to the 
state's segregation laws. Unfortunately, this was long before anyone seriously consid-
ered challenging such policies in court. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 133. 
232. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 65-66. 
233. Jd. at 71-72, 75-77, 86-87. 
234. Hubbell, supra note 109, at 375-76. 
235. McLaU?in, 339 U.S. at 639-40. The lower court, relying upon Plessy, held that it 
lacked authority to "obliterate social or racial distinctions which the State has tradition-
ally recognized as a basis for classification for purposes of education" and that it had a 
duty "to honor the public policy of the State in matters relating to its internal social 
affairs." McLaurin was partaking of the same facilities as all other students at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma. The conditions to which he had been subjected "rest[ ed] upon a 
reasonable basis, having [their] foundation in the public policy of the State, and d[o] not 
therefore deprive [him] of the equal protection of the laws." Therefore, the court con-
cluded in language reminiscent of Plessy, "we cannot find any justifiable legal basis for 
the mental discomfiture which the plaintiff says deprives him of equal educational facili-
ties here." McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 87 F. Supp. 528, 
530-31 (W.D. Okla. 1949) (three-judge court) (per curiam). 
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tained extensive appendices detailing federal and state judicial 
decisions upholding segregation and reprinting excerpts from 
reports questioning the wisdom of departing from the estab-
lished pattern of race relations that had grown up in reliance 
upon Plessy. Eleven other states submitted an amicus curiae brief 
in support ofTexas' position. 236 Six amicus briefs opposing seg-
regation were also filed. In addition to the Solicitor General's 
memorandum on behalf of the United States, the most notable of 
these came from an ad hoc group known as the Committee of 
Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education.237 
1. The NAACP Argument for Sweatt.-Marshall made three 
principal points in his brief for Sweatt. First, applying traditional 
constitutional doctrine, he maintained that segregation lacked 
any rational purpose and hence was invalid. Because "there is no 
rational connection between racial differences and any valid leg-
islative objective which a state may attempt to promote in provid-
ing public education," Marshall contended, "identical treatment 
of the races is mandatory."238 The importance of education for 
the creation of an informed and responsible citizenry had 
prompted every state to take over from the private sector the 
principal burden of providing schools. 239 There was no basis for 
)elieving that the races differed in their intrinsic ability to 
earn.240 Since education for democracy was designed to elimi-
1ate arbitrary distinctions and segregation imposed just such dis-
inctions, segregation was incompatible with the basic concept of 
mblic schooling.241 These considerations applied with even 
rreater force to state-supported law schools.242 
Not content to rest upon these philosophical considerations, 
236. See Brief of the States of Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mis-
ssippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, Amici Cu-
ae [hereinafter cited as States Amicus Brief]. 
237. Other amicus briefs in support of Sweatt came from the American Federation of 
'ea_chers, the American Veterans Committee, the American jewish Congress and other 
!Wish organizations, and the Texas Council of Negro Organizations. 
238. Brief for Petitioner at 12. 
239. !d. at 13. 
240. !d. at 24. 
241. ld. at 15, 19-21. 
242. I d. at 16-19. The brief further argued that segregation cannot be justified as a 
ean_s for preventing breaches of the peace. Even if protecting public order were a 
ffi~Ient justification, however, the experience of other Southern and border states-
d Indeed of The University of Texas School of Medicine-which had admitted blacks 
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Marshall went on to point out that segregation damaged society 
at large. He suggested that segregation promoted interracial iso-
lation, mistrust, and misunderstanding and inflicted a "badge of 
inferiority" upon the minority group. Education under these 
conditions would have a particularly serious impact upon a black 
lawyer, severely limiting the special contributions that he other-
wise could make both to his clients and to the community as a 
whole. Since segregation offered society no benefits in return 
for the serious harms it imposed, the practice could not be 
justified.243 
Second, he launched a careful but somewhat oblique attack 
on Plessy. He began by distinguishing the decision as dealing 
only with transportation, a field in which equality of separate fa-
cilities is' much more readily assessed than in education, which 
implicates "psychological, sociological, and spiritual factors in 
addition to pure physical measurements."244 He then argued 
that the difference in the procedural posture of the two cases-
Plessy had come up for review of a judgment sustaining a demur-
rer, whereas this one followed a full trial at which the equality 
issue had been fully litigated-afforded yet another reason for 
closer scrutiny of Sweatt's claim. 245 
Marshall concluded this portion of his brief with two substan-
tive jibes at Plessy. No subsequent decision of the Court had 
to formerly all-white universities had shown the fear of violence and discord to be illu-
sory. !d. at 22-23. 
The Texas experience involved a black medical student named Herman Barnett. 
The all-white University of Texas agreed contractually to provide graduate instruction 
to black Texas State University students when TSU could not provide such training. 
The Texas faculty taught the blacks outside the white campus, and the students earned 
Texas State credits. An exception was made for Barnett because the exorbitant cost of 
separate off-campus instruction made that alternative financially unfeasible. Instead, 
Barnett was permitted to study at the Galveston branch of The University of Texas. No 
problems of any kind resulted from this arrangement. See Report of the First Negro 
Student to Enter the Medical School, Texas Council Amicus Brief, supm note 115, App. 
C; 0. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 87. 
243. Brief for Petitioner at 26-31. 
Only after arguing that segregation could not survive even the traditional rationality 
review in this case did Marshall invoke more recent decisions applying more exacting 
scrutiny to racial classifications. Since the state had failed to demonstrate a compelling 
interest to justify its race-based refusal to admit Sweatt to The University of Texas, it 
had denied him the equal protection of the laws. !d. at 31-35. 
244. !d. at 44. The brief does not explain what "spiritual factors" might be relevant 
to a determination of the equality of two educational institutions. 
245. !d. at 45-46. 
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squarely upheld the extension of "separate but equal" to educa-
tion, so "that case is not applicable to this problem. " 246 Only at 
this point, and as a last resort, did Marshall urge the Court to 
overrule Plessy. He based this argument on a rather perfunctory 
review of the background of the fourteenth amendment.247 More 
significantly, he presented statistics showing that whatever might 
be said for segregation in theory, as a factual matter, it had ut-
terly failed to afford anything remotely approaching equal educa-
tional facilities for blacks. This suggested that "equality, within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, can never be real-
ized under a system of segregation. " 248 
Finally, even if "separate but equal" were the appropriate 
legal standard, Texas had not provided and never could provide 
equality under segregation. The history and pattern of public ex-
penditures for higher education in Texas showed that unlawful 
discrimination was inevitable so long as the state required that 
blacks and whites study apart from each other.249 Most impor-
tant, the two law schools were plainly not equal. Aside from 
Texas State's lack of accreditation, there was no comparison be-
tween the physical plant of the two institutions.250 In addition, 
the black school, for all practical purposes, possessed no in-
dependent library, had absolutely no full-time faculty, and lacked 
the number of students required to staff a law review, moot 
court, and other facilities "which are essential to achieving the 
objectives of a modern law school. " 251 Further, racial restrictions 
on enrollment would deprive black law students of the benefits of 
"mutual interchange of ideas and attitudes."252 
2. The Law Professors' Amicus Brief-The Committee of Law 
Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education originated at 
Yale Law School, where Thomas I. Emerson and John P. Frank 
_246. !d. at 51. Earlier, the brief distinguished Cumming (which was miscited as "Cum-
mzngs"), Berea College, Gong Lum, Gaines, and Sipuel as cases in which the validity of segre-
gation was either conceded or not litigated. !d. at 4 7-51. 
247. Id. at 54-61. 
248. !d. at 65. 
249. ld. at 67-71. This portion of the brief relied heavily upon an analysis prepared 
for the trial by Dean Charles H. Thompson of Howard University. The trial judge, how-
ever, refused to consider this evidence in making his ruling. See supm note 214. 
250. Brief for Petitioner at 71. 
251. Id. at 73. 
252. Id. at 74. 
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were members of the faculty. Both were friends of Thurgood 
Marshall; Frank previously had worked with him on other litiga-
tion.253 A group of seven distinguished professors from six lead-
ing law schools drafted the brief; ultimately 188 signed it.254 
Their argument was simple: "[S]egregated legal education ... 
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. " 255 
The main points in the professors' brief did not differ materi-
ally from those which Sweatt's counsel presented, but their em-
phases contrasted sharply. Where Marshall finessed, the Law 
Teachers made a frontal attack on Plessy as the centerpiece of 
their argument. They first contended that Congress proposed 
the fourteenth au1endment and passed numerous pieces of civil 
rights legislation during Reconstruction in order to outlaw all 
forms of segregation and discrimimition against blacks.256 Next, 
they claimed that the conceptual underpinnings of Plessy-that 
legislation could not overcome the innate differences and hostil-
ity between the races and that any attempt to do so would only 
exacerbate social conflict-had been disproven by intervening 
events.257 Referring to the government's brief in Henderson, they 
observed that segregation had caused serious harm to blacks, de-
moralized whites, and generally aggravated "the grave maladjust-
ments inherent in the system."258 Moreover, their own analysis 
253. SeeR. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 275. Frank had met Marshall while he was teach-
ing at Indiana University. Marshall went there to discuss a potential suit challenging 
discrimination in restaurants near the campus and other matters. The litigation was 
never filed because direct action by students and faculty led to the elimination of the 
objectionable practices. See Frank, Can the Cow·ts Emse the Color Line?, 2 BuFF. L. REV. 28, 
43 (1952). 
254. Besides Emerson and Frank, the authors of the Brief of the Committee of Law 
Teachers Against Segreg-ation in Legal Education as Amicus Curiae, Sweatt v. Painter, 
339 U.S. 629 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Law Teachers Brief], included Alexander H. 
Frey of the University of Pennsylvania, Dean Erwin N. Griswold of Harvard Law School, 
Robert Hale of Columbia University, Dean Harold Havighurst of Northwestern Univer-
sity, and Edward H. Levi of the University of Chicago. The brief was reprinted a month 
before oral arguments in the l'v!innesota Law Review. See Segregation and the Equal Protection 
Clause: Brief for the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education, 34 MINN. 
L. REV. 289 (1950). 
Only four of the signers came from the South, a fact which prompted one of the 
authors of the brief to characterize the endeavor as "a cheap virtue." Frank, supra note 
253, at 31. 
255. Law Teachers Brief, supra note 254, at 2, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 290. 
256. !d. at 4-22, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 291-307. 
257. !d. at 23-24, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 307. 
258. !d. at 31, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 314. 
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of the effects of official policies relating to voting, education, 
housing, the military services, and employment confirmed that 
"elimination of patterns of segregation is not only feasible but is 
rapidly going forward under government sponsorship."259 Thus, 
Plessy was neither good law nor sound logic and should be 
rejected. 
Further, even if the "separate but equal" doctrine were con-
sistent with the fourteenth amendment, that doctrine did not ap-
ply and should not be extended to education. This argument 
paralleled the position that Marshall had taken in his brief for 
Sweatt,260 although the law professors added some nuances of 
their own. The Plessy Court, they observed, carefully stated that 
segregation must be reasonable. 261 The decision in Buchanan v. 
Warley, 262 which struck down a residential segregation ordinance, 
suggested that the validity of mandatory racial separation must 
be evaluated in each context. No prior education case had 
squarely addressed the issue. Thus, "if segregation in education 
is constitutional, it became so under a rule of law that came from 
no place."263 
Applying the criterion announced in Plessy itself, the profes-
sors contended that segregation in education was unreasonable 
and hence unlawful. Not only did segregation impose grave 
harm upon its victims, but monitoring separate schools to assure 
the requisite equality was a quixotic exercise.264 Moreover, seg-
regated schools were inherently destructive of democratic values 
because they prevented students from getting to know and work 
with persons of other backgrounds and experiences.265 There-
fore, with the question squarely presented, the Court should re-
fuse to extend the Plessy doctrine to public education. 
Finally, they maintained that, even if Plessy had correctly ap-
plied the fourteenth amendment and even if segregation in edu-
cation were reasonable at least in some circumstances, the two 
Texas law schools were inherently unequal. Thus, blacks never 
259. 
260. 
261. 
262. 
263. 
264. 
265. 
ld. at 29, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 312. 
See supra text accompanying note 244; compare Brief for Petitioner at 42-51. 
163 U.S. at 550; see supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
245 U.S. 60 (1917); see supra notes 74-75 & 79 and accompanying text. 
Law Teachers Brief, supra note 254, at 35, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 317. 
ld. at 35, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 317-18. 
ld. at 36-38, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 318-20. 
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could obtain the absolute educational parity to which they were 
entitled so long as the state obliged them to submit to segregate< 
legal training. In short, they invoked the Plessy doctrine itself t< 
argue that true equality in legal education was impossible in ra 
cially separate law schools.266 
Relying upon points made at trial by Dean Harrison and Pro 
fessor Sharp, the Law Teachers emphasized that the all-blacl 
Texas State law school was distinctly inferior to the all-white Uni 
versity of Texas law school on what they called purely mechanica 
factors, such as physical plant. But they insisted that the inequal 
ities were even more pronounced due to "factors peculiar tc 
legal education."267 Their brief examined each of these factor: 
in turn. 
First, a small faculty cannot specialize and necessarily offer: 
less diversity of viewpoints to students, even if each individua 
student may have greater access to each instructor. The pro 
jected four-person faculty at Texas State was inadequate in abso 
lute terms to provide a first-class education and was vastl; 
inferior to the twenty-eight-member instructional staff a 
Texas. 268 
Second, small law schools lack important inducements, in 
eluding library and other resources, that might permit thei1 
faculty to develop national reputations and attract truly outstand 
ing teachers and scholars from other institutions. The Texa: 
faculty had many nationally prominent members, but it was "be 
yond belief that Texas [State could] at any time in the predictable 
future acquire the services of their equal. " 269 
Third, small schools with small faculties necessarily must af 
ford a narrower variety of courses than larger ones. Based upor 
the listings in the catalogues of the two institutions, Texas wa: 
offering approximately twice as many courses as Texas State.27< 
Fourth, the limited library holdings at Texas State in contras 
to those at The University of Texas would significantly restric 
266. !d. at 39, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 320-21. 
267. !d. at 40, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 322. 
268. !d. at 41, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 322. 
269. !d. at 42, rep1inted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 323. In any event, the professors added 
Texas State certainly could not attract similarly renowned professors before Sweat 
graduated. 
270. !d. at 42 & n.IOO, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 323 & n.lOO. 
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the quality of research and instruction available to students. It 
would cost approximately $100,000 to equalize the basic collec-
tion of the two law schools, but there was no indication that the 
state was prepared to spend anywhere near that amount of 
money for the Texas State library. 271 
Fifth, the prestige of the institution and the prominence of its 
alumni significantly affect placement opportunities for its current 
students. Texas State, as a new school with no graduates and no 
reputation in the community when Sweatt sought to begin his 
legal studies, simply could not provide him with anything re-
motely similar to those available to him at "the old, established 
school. " 272 
Sixth, very small schools cannot support a law review and its 
attendant intellectual and professional benefits. The law review 
at The University of Texas was "excellent," but there was no 
prospect for a similar journal at the much smaller Texas State law 
school "for lack of a sufficient number of topnotch students to 
man it. " 273 
Seventh, a satisfactory moot court program requires a large 
enough enrollment to stimulate effective competition among stu-
dents. The white school had such a pool of students upon which 
to draw for "satisfactory competitive groups," whereas the black 
school did not.274 
Eighth, clinical programs also require enough advanced stu-
dents to supervise beginners. There was an extensive legal aid 
program at Texas; it was unclear whether any similar program 
existed at Texas State except on paper.275 
In short, the new law school which Texas had created under 
the pressure of litigation and to which it proposed to consign 
Heman Sweatt and all other prospective black attorneys was 
markedly inferior to the long-established and nationally promi-
271. ld. at 42-43, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 323-24. The professors defined 
equalization of the collections to mean that Texas State would have the same number of 
nonduplicate volumes as did Texas. 
1
272
· ld. at 43, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 324 (footnote omitted). The disparity in r acement opportunities was especially important since the assistant dean of the white 
aw school had recently warned in an article in the Texas Bar· journal of an impending 
oversupply of lawyers in the state. ;;!· ld. at 43, reprinted ~n 34 MINN. L. REv. at 324. 
275· ld. at 44, repnnted zn 34 MINN. L. REv. at 324. 
· ld., reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 325. 
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nent institution which was reserved for whites. Even if the 
"mechanical" aspects of the two schools were equal and the new 
one for blacks were able to overcome the less tangible disparities 
already mentioned, however, the professors contended that 
Texas State still would not be equal to The University of Texas. 
Inequality would exist because "the segregated plan misses the 
whole purpose of a modern law school."276 
The crucial point was that lawyers must understand the com-
munities and the society in which they practice. To this end, they 
need to learn their craft and exchange ideas with a representative 
group of future practitioners. On this score, the white school 
had significant advantages since it would contain a much broader 
cross-section of the population than would the black one. By lim-
iting Texas State to blacks, the state was depriving Sweatt of the 
chance to exchange ideas "with a complete variety of fellow stu-
dents."277 This, in turn, would handicap him "in advising clients 
or in dealing with attorneys and judges who are a part of the 
broad stream of Texas jurisprudence deepened as a result of the 
years of group association at the [white] school."278 Moreover, 
Texas State, by its size, could not attract enough good students 
or a sufficient diversity of viewpoints and experiences to make for 
a truly stimulating educational environment. 279 
The Law Teachers concluded their indictment of the state's 
approach as follows: 
The inescapable inequality of Texas [State] lies in the fact 
that legal education is not a mere matter of cubic feet of class-
room space, or the possession of a few thousand books, or the 
presence offour lawyers recently become teachers. If, instead, 
legal education is something alive and vital, if the measure is 
not cubic feet of air space but the intellectual atmosphere 
within the walls, if law teachers are appraised as individual men 
of varying degrees of talent, if education is in large part associa-
tion, if research and practice are part of the job of legal train-
ing, if segregation in law school warps and corrupts the mind 
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 45, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 326. 
Presumably, white students also would suffer from the inability to meet and work 
with blacks, although the brief does not explicitly discuss the effects of segregation on 
white students at this point. The failure to address this matter undoubtedly was not 
intended as a retreat from the professors' earlier argument concerning the adverse soci-
etal effects of racial discrimination. See supra text accompanying note 258. 
278. Law Teachers Brief, supm note 254, at 46, rep1inted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 326. 
279. Id. 
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and personality of man-if any of these things is true, then cer-
tainly this Texas Negro institution is a mockery of legal education and of 
the equal protection of the laws. 280 
51 
3. The State's Position.-Texas argued simply that the consti-
tutionality of segregation had long since been settled by an un-
broken line of federal and state judicial decisions dating back 
over the previous century and that the lower courts in this case 
had correctly found the two law schools to be substantially 
equal.281 Mter listing many of these decisions and reciting lan-
guage that either expressly endorsed or pretermitted discussion 
of the compatibility of segregation with the fourteenth amend-
ment, the state concluded that the prior cases "argue them-
selves" in support of the propriety of "separate but equal" 
educational institutions.282 
280. Id. at 47, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 327 (emphasis added). 
281. The 11 states which supported Texas essentially endorsed its argument that the 
constitutionality of segregation had been conclusively resolved by Plessy and its progeny. 
They disclaimed any interest in the resolution of the factual question of the equality of 
the two law schools. States Amicus Brief, supra note 236, at 2. Instead, they emphasized 
that segregation laws in at least 17 states and the District of Columbia would be affected 
by the result of this case. Id. at 3-5. While conceding that "in some instances schools for 
Negroes [may] have fallen below the standards of schools maintained for whites," they 
contended that "discrimination is not implicit in separate schools." !d. at 5-6. Then, 
relying upon recent journalistic accounts of racial conflict in Northern and border com-
munities, id. at 7-9, these states suggested that the elimination of segregation would 
engender widespread violence and the destruction of the public schools. I d. at 10-11. 
Although Texas advanced some of the same arguments, it did so in a somewhat 
more subtle fashion. See infra note 287 and accompanying text. These states bluntly 
raised the prospect of intermarriage in language reminiscent of the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals in Berea College and implicit in Justice McReynolds' dissent in Gaines. See supra 
notes 64 & 101-102 and accompanying text. In order to put a somewhat better face on 
the point, these states suggested that opposition to social commingling existed among 
all races: 
Experiences of the past have left marks that no laws or court decisions can 
era~e ~vernight. It is a mistake for any "observer from afar" to assume that 
preJudice and fear against "crossing the line" in intimate social contact are lim-
Ited to the Southern white man alone. They exist just as strongly in the average 
Negro man of the South. Negro men do not want their daughters, wives, and 
sweethearts dancing, dating, and playing with white men any more than white 
men want their women folk in intimate social contact with Negro men. "White 
trash" is the hated name which Southern Negroes apply to white men who keep 
~~e company of their women folk. Worse names are applied to Negro men who 
cross t~e line." The result in the South today is almost universal antipathy 
toward. mtimate mixed social relationships. The results of the disregard of 
t~ese crrcumstances in the past have been tragic to both races, physically, so-
Cially, and politically. 
St;tes Am~cus Brief, supra note 236, at 10. 
l"d.82. Bnef for Respondents at 42. The state listed all of the cases upholding the va-
1 Ity of segregated education in an appendix. Id. at 211-23. 
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Even if Plessy did not expressly control the case, the state 
made two arguments that its underlying principles applied as 
strongly to education as to transportation. First, there was ample 
evidence that the equal protection clause was not intended to 
prohibit segregated schools. 283 Second, and more significantly, it 
was apparent that this type of segregation was eminently reason-
able.284 In addition to the numerous prior cases supporting that 
conclusion, the state cited and discussed a variety of reports, in-
cluding: (1) dissenting statements in the reports of the Presi-
dent's Commission on Higher Education and the President's 
Committee on Civil Rights, (2) the 1944 recommendation of the 
Bi-Racial Committee on Education for Negroes in Texas that a 
separate university for blacks be established, (3) the results of a 
Texas Poll showing overwhelming public endorsement of that 
recommendation in preference to desegregating The University 
of Texas,285 and (4) the practice of the Federal Council of 
Churches which, despite the position of its amicus brief on behalf 
of Sweatt, permitted its members to maintain segregated congre-
gations and educational institutions in the South.286 Moreover, 
there was every reason to believe that desegregation would lead 
to serious breaches of the peace and a calamitous decline in pop-
ular support for the public schools. 287 
Finally, the state maintained that the lower courts' resolution 
283. /d. at 43-68. 
284. Id. at 76-92. 
285. The Texas Poll results showed overwhelming white and narrow black opposition 
to desegregating The University of Texas. A large majority of whites and a much 
smaller majority of blacks favored instead the creation of an entirely new and separate 
university for blacks. !d. at 86. The figures, however, were presented in a rather un-
helpful format. The statistical table showed percentages of all respondents rather than 
of each racial group. 
Further, the brief provides no information concerning the size or method of selec-
tion of the sample. Thus, there is no way to assess the reliability of the data. The results 
for blacks are likely to be especially questionable since they comprised only 14 percent 
of those surveyed. This would be the case even though black interviewers talked with 
black respondents in order to encourage those persons to voice their true attitudes. !d. 
at 86 n.99. The statistical margin of error for the small subset of black respondents is 
likely to be so large as to call into question the accuracy of the results, particularly if the 
total number of completed interviews was much below 1,000. For explanation of the 
mathematics involved, see H. BLALOCK, JR., SociAL STATISTICS 135-53 (1960); C. MosER, 
SURVEY METHODS IN SOCIAL INVESTIGATION 115-21 (1958). 
286. Brief for Respondents at 87-88. 
287. In support of this argument, Texas cited the discussion of recent episodes of 
racial friction outside the South in the amicus brief of the states which endorsed its 
position. /d. at 93. Texas also alluded to the dread of social commingling between the 
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of the question of the equality of the two law schools could not 
be disturbed. Most fundamentally, Texas contended that this is-
sue was not properly before the Court because Sweatt had not 
properly raised it in the Court of Civil Appeals. 288 Even if the 
Court determined to examine the matter for itself, the record es-
tablished that Texas State in fact was substantially equal to 
Texas. To support this claim, the state reviewed the comparisons 
between the two institutions made at trial by Dean McCormick 
and Professor Walker, among others. 289 Moreover, since the 
original trial, the Texas State University for Negroes, including 
its law school, had opened in Houston. The interim law school in 
Austin had closed. The permanent law school had been provi-
sionally accredited by the American Bar Association, and its first 
graduate had been admitted to the state bar. More than 2,000 
races. It did so in a more restrained fashion than had the other states, but the point was 
unmistakably clear: 
Undoubtedly one of the things which gives rise to the necessity for separa-
tion of the races is a historic antipathy of many of both races for a forced close 
personal, social contact. Beside the daily association in the classroom, at least 
some of which is social, universities and public schools officially maintain and 
sponsor extracurricular activities which do involve close personal social con-
tacts. For example, there are school dances, rooms or halls for visiting, danc-
ing, for playing various games, swimming, and so forth. Also connected with 
colleges are donnitories where the living together is on a more or less intimate 
plane. 
!d. at 93-94 (footnote omitted). 
288. !d. at l00-07. The Court of Civil Appeals, in denying Sweatt's petition for re-
hearing, said that its 'jurisdiction in this latter regard was not invoked in this case." 210 
S.W.2d at 448. The state based its argument upon this statement. Sweatt's counsel 
contended that they had not waived this claim of error in the lower court. See Peti-
tioner's Reply Brief to Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 4-5. 
The entire debate on this point may have been academic. The Court of Civil Ap-
peals, after noting Sweatt's supposed procedural blunder, immediately went on to state: 
"However, we have carefully considered the evidence from that viewpoint ... ; and 
were our jurisdiction in that regard properly invoked we would be constrained to hold 
that its preponderance and overwhelming weight support the trial court's judgment 
· · · ·" 210 S.W.2d at 448. As the Supreme Court has explained in a series of habeas 
corpus cases, an area in which it has steadfastly refused to consider questions "which 
were not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due to [a party's] failure to raise 
them there as required by state procedure," Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) 
(~mp~asis deleted), there is no reason to apply the procedural default doctrine in situa-
~~~ns In which the state court has addressed the merits of a claim notwithstanding any 
~Ilure to comply with applicable state procedural requirements. E.g., Ulster County 
5~urt v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 149, 152-54 (1979); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 
1 
2 n.5 (1976). Since the Court of Civil Appeals affirmatively determined that the two 
aw schools were equal, there was no reason for the Supreme Court to sidestep the issue. 
289. Brief for Respondents at 107-19 . 
.... ________________ _ 
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students were enrolled in the entirely new university.290 Thus, 
the state obviously was acting in good faith to provide the best 
possible education to all of its students. 291 
C. The Position of the Federal Government 
The Truman administration played an important role in all 
three cases. The United States was a nominal defendant in Hen-
derson. 292 In the district court, the Justice Department repre-
sented the ICC. When the case reached the Supreme Court, 
however, the Department refused to defend the Commission. 
Solicitor General Perlman filed a sixty-six-page brief that began 
by confessing error and concluded by calling upon the Court to 
repudiate Plessy. 293 This was the first time that the federal gov-
ernment had explicitly urged the abandonment of "separate but 
equal. "294 
In addition to acknowledging that the railroad's dining car 
regulations were unlawful, the administration brief forcibly ar-
gued that, contrary to Plessy, "legally-enforced racial segregation 
in and of itself constitutes a discrimination and inequality of 
treatment," irrespective of the physical equality of the separate 
facilities that might be provided. 295 Indeed, where segregation 
was officially sanctioned, "the phrase 'separate but equal' is a 
plain contradiction in terms."296 Segregation of blacks was "uni-
290. !d. at 120-22. 
291. /d. at 119. 
292. By statute, the United States must be a party to any action brought against the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 2322 (1982). 
293. After explaining the status of the United States as a statutory party, the brief 
stated: 
Since the United St:Jtes is of the view, however, that the order of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission [upholding the railroad's segregated dining car regula-
tion] is invalid, this brief sets forth the grounds upon which it is submitted that 
the judgment of the district court is erroneous and should be reversed. 
Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 1-2. 
294. Hutchinson, supra note 223, at 18. This was not, however, the first time that the 
Truman administration had urged the Court to reject segregation. In the restrictive 
covenant cases, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 
(1948), Attorney General Clark and Solicitor General Perlman filed a 123-page amicus 
curiae brief on behalf of the United States. The first 4 7 pages of that brief described in 
detail the operation and deleterious effects of such covenants all over the countrv. For 
accounts of the administration's decision to file this brief, seeR. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 
252-53; C. VosE, CAUCASIANS ONLY 168-74 (1959). 
295. Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 24. 
296. /d. at 34-35. 
... 
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versally understood as imposing on them a badge of inferiority. 
It 'brands the Negro with the mark of inferiority and asserts that 
he is not fit to associate with white people.' " 297 The physical 
separation of black diners from whites plainly was designed to 
emphasize their subordinate status. 298 
Nearly half of the administration brief was devoted to a vigor-
ous attack on Plessy. The government contended that the nondis-
crimination provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act rather 
than Plessy controlled the case. If "separate but equal" were rele-
vant, then Plessy should be overruled since the legal and factual 
assumptions upon which it rested had long since been discred-
ited.299 In somewhat different terms than Marshall's argument in 
Sweatt, the government maintained that segregation caused sub-
stantial harm to the public interest. That practice limited oppor-
tunities for blacks, forced whites to engage in extensive hypocrisy 
to justify the practice, promoted mutual suspicion between the 
races, and held the country up to condemnation and ridicule in 
the international arena.300 Thus, Plessy was "a constitutional 
297. Jd. at 27-28 (footnotes omitted) (quoting PRESIDENT's COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 79 (1947)). 
298. Id. at 28-32. The government argued that the statutory requirement of "sub-
stantial equality of treatment," Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 ( 1942), went 
well beyond the purely physical aspects of dining car service: 
Manifestly, colored passengers would be discriminated against if the railroad's 
rules required its waiters to say, when serving them: "Don't think, because we 
have to serve you, that we believe you're as good as whites." The wrong would 
be compounded if a loud-speaking device carried these words to every diner in 
the car. But in substance, although the form may have been less offensive, 
these were the conditions under which the railroad furnished dining car service 
to [such] passengers. 
Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 31-32. 
299. Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 35-49. 
According to the government, Plessy rested upon two dubious premises. One was 
that officially mandated segregation did not necessarily imply the inferiority of any 
group. That proposition was plainly incorrect as a matter of fact in 1950, whatever its 
accuracy may have been in 1896. I d. at 40-41 & n.35. The other was that the fourteenth 
a~endment protected only civil and political rights but not social equality. The issue in 
this case, however, concerned travel for business; the right to "substantial equality of 
treatment," McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914), therefore 
could not be dismissed as merely social. Henderson Brief, supm note 227, at 42-43. 
300. Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 49-64. With respect to blacks, the govern-
ment maintained: 
. . Segregation is a dominant factor in every aspect of the Negro's life. It 
hmits his physical movements and economic opportunities, and adversely af-
~ects his personality and social development. It is much more thanjim-crowism 
m vehicles and public places. It is an ostracism symbolizing inferiority which 
colors his thoughts and action at almost every moment. 
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anachronism which no longer deserves a place in our law." 30 1 
The government did not rest upon this extraordinary denun-
ciation of Plessy and its insistence that segregation inflicted digni-
tary injury irrespective of the equality of the separate facilities. 
Attorney General McGrath underlined the administration's view 
by participating personally at oral argument in support of Hen-
derson.302 Moreover, the administration filed a memorandum as 
amicus curiae in Sweatt and lvfcLaurin. Unlike the detailed sub-
stantive arguments in the Henderson brief, this memorandum was 
largely rhetorical. It began with the statement that "[t]hese cases 
... test the vitality and strength of the democratic ideals to 
which the United States is dedicated,"303 then quoted extensively 
from Strauder v. West Virginia 304 and Shelley v. Kraemer, 305 and con-
cluded, echoing the more extensive argument in the Henderson 
brief, that Plessy was "wrong as a matter of law, history, and pol-
icy" that should be repudiated "as an unwarranted deviation 
from the principle of equality under law."306 
D. The Decision 
The Court unanimously favored the civil rights claims in all 
three cases. The segregated dining car policy that caused Elmer 
!d. at 49-50 (footnote omitted). The brief supported this position with detailed refer-
ences to a series of medical, psychological, and sociological studies of the deleterious 
effects of segregation on black physical and mental health. !d. at 49-55. 
Whites suffer guilt and demoralization; the institution of segregation also "pro-
mote[s] the master race psychology, thus sowing the seeds for oppressive individual and 
collective action." !d. at 56. 
As to the harm to the nation as a whole, the government cited another series of 
studies condemning segregation: 
Experience and informed opinion are in agreement that normal contacts 
between the races diminish prejudice while enforced separation intensifies it. 
Race relations are improved by living together, working together, serving to-
gether, going to school together. The absence of a color line in ... countries [such 
as Brazil] goes far to show that racial prejudice is not instinctive or hereditary, 
but is rather kept alive by man-made barriers such as segregation. 
!d. at 57 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). This portion of the brief concluded by 
listing several recent occasions upon which foreign nations had condemned the United 
States for permitting segregation to exist within its borders. !d. at 60-63. 
30 I. !d. at 65. 
302. Henderson, 339 U.S. at 817, 822-23. 
303. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1-2, McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950}, and Sweatt v. Painter, 
339 U.S. 629 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Memorandum]. 
304. 100 u.s. 303 (1880). 
305. 334 U.S. I (1948). 
306. Amicus Memorandum, supra note 303, at 9-10. 
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Henderson to go hungry was "undue or unreasonable prejudice 
or disadvantage" prohibited by section 3(1) of the Interstate 
Commerce Act.307 Since the policy plainly violated the statute, 
Justice Burton explained that there was no occasion to "reach the 
constitutional or other issues" suggested by the parties.308 The 
state-imposed internal segregation to which George McLaurin 
had been subjected "impair[ed] and inhibit[ed] his ability to 
study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other 
students, and ... to learn his profession."309 The state effec-
tively had deprived him of the chance "to secure acceptance by 
his fellow students on his own merits. " 310 Thus, as Chief Justice 
Vinson put it, Oklahoma had denied him his "personal and pres-
ent right to the equal protection of the laws."311 Both opinions 
were muted in tone and narrow in substance; both suggested that 
these were relatively straightforward cases.312 
The opinion in Sweatt, also written by Vinson, was similarly 
brief and to the point. It entirely avoided the constitutional argu-
ments that the parties and amici had energetically pressed. The 
third sentence of the opinion read: "Broader issues have been 
urged for our consideration, but we adhere to the principle of 
deciding constitutional questions only in the context of the par-
ticular case before [us]."313 The balance of the decision focused 
upon whether the separate law schools were actually equal. 
The Court emphasized the differences between the two insti-
tutions, but its analysis bore the unmistakable imprint of the Law 
Teachers' amicus brief. After comparing the mechanical aspects 
of the interim and permanent Texas State law schools with those 
307. Henderson, 339 U.S. at 824-26. 
308. !d. at 826. 
309. McLaU7in, 339 U.S. at 641. 
310. !d. at 642. 
311. !d. 
312. In fact, the Court had no difficulty agreeing upon the outcome in Henderson and 
McLaurin. Hutchinson, supm note 223, at 24-25. There were differences of view, how-
ever, as to precisely how to draft the opinions. Some members of the Court, notably 
Justice Douglas, wanted to use Hende1·son to overrule Plessy. Others, particularly Justice 
Frankfurter, wanted to avoid any premature resolution of the constitutionality of segre-
gated education. In the interest of achieving unanimity, Chief Justice Vinson and Justice 
Burton accommodated most of their colleagues' suggested revisions. !d. at 26-29. They 
succeeded at least to the extent that no member of the Court wrote separately; Justice 
Douglas, however, concurred only in the result in Henderson. See Henderson, 339 U.S. at 
826. 
313. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631. 
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at The University of Texas, the Chief Justice concluded that the 
state had not provided substantial equality of educational oppor-
tunity for black and white law students. 314 Beyond the tangible 
differences, the white law school "possesse[d] to a far greater de-
gree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but 
which make for greatness in a law school," including faculty reputa-
tion, alumni influence, and institutional prestige and tradition.315 
No reasonable person who could choose freely between the two 
institutions "would consider the question close."316 Finally, the 
white school offered incomparable advantages: 
Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose 
to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of 
ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is con-
cerned. The law school to which Texas is willing to admit 
[Sweatt] excludes from its student body members of the racial 
groups which number 85% of the population of the State and 
includes most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges, and 
other officials with whom [he] will inevitably be dealing when 
he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such a substan-
tial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot con-
clude that the education offered [Sweatt] is substantially equal 
to that which he would receive if admitted to the University of 
Texas Law SchooP 17 
The Court held that Sweatt had a "personal and pres~nt" 
right to "legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to 
students of other races."318 Because the separate law school did 
not afford him the quality of legal education provided in the all-
white institution, "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that [he] be admitted to the University of 
Texas Law School. " 319 
This terse holding cannot obscure the breathtakingly broad 
implications of the Court's reasoning. "Separate but equal" pre-
sumably was still the law, but for the first time the "equal" com-
314. Id: at 633-34. 
315. !d. at 634 (emphasis added). 
316. !d. The Chief Justice continued: "It is unlikely that a member of a group so 
decisively in the majority, attending a school with rich traditions and prestige which only 
a history of consistently maintained excellence could command, would claim that the 
opportunities afforded him for legal education were unequal to those" offered to Sweatt. 
!d. at 634-35. 
317. !d. at 634. 
318. !d. at 635. 
319. !d. at636. 
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ponent of the doctrine was given real bite. The Court refused to 
defer to whatever the state had provided in the name of equiva-
lence. Moreover, it adopted a very expansive definition of equal-
ity. The Justices could have focused exclusively upon the 
physical or mechanical differences between the two law schools. 
These differences were obvious but they were not overwhelming. 
But the opinion goes well beyond such presumably objective fac-
tors to inquire into a broad range of qualitative matters which 
affect the evaluation of an institution. This was absolutely un-
precedented. Never before had the Court examined the educa-
tional process in such detail. 
Thus, the Court's refusal to reconsider the validity of Plessy at 
least in the context of graduate and professional education could 
not be taken as the last word on the subject. After Sweatt, it 
seemed that separate law schools could never be equal: if Texas 
State, which had been the beneficiary of an apparently sincere 
effort to create a respectable and fully accredited institution in 
the shortest possible time in the wealthiest state which enforced 
segregation, was constitutionally deficient, it was difficult to im-
agine any alternative that would pass muster. Any new program 
or institution for blacks would lack the history, tradition, pres-
tige, and accreditation of any existing one for whites. 320 
In short, these rulings cast a long shadow over the "separate 
.but equal" doctrine. l'vlcLaurin and Hendenon made plain that 
blacks could not be excluded from public places unless separate 
facilities were provided for them. And Sweatt made clear that any 
~eparate facility would have to satisfy stringent criteria of equal-
Ity. These decisions strongly implied that implementing truly 
equal segregated facilities would be enormously expensive, and 
perhaps impossible. The cases might be limited to their facts, 
but logically there seemed to be no limit to their potential for 
undermining segregation. Indeed, a week after the decisions 
h
320
· It does not seem likely that another state could have fared more successfully 
t anT - ··d · · N h exas ~1 In th1s case. For example, an all-black law school began operations at the 
0
1rt C~rolma College for Negroes shortly after the decision in Gaines. The state acted vo untanlv and ·th · · . · . th C 1 WI out any 1mmed1ate threat of ht1gat10n. Nevertheless, a decade later Su~ 
1 
O~rt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying the analytical model adopted in N:a ~· C eld ~hat this school was not equal to the all-white law school at the University of 
latt:tr . a:oh~a. Accordingly, the court ordered four black applicants admitted to the 
F. 2d ~~~tl(tutJon: and the Supreme Court denied review. McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 
4th Cu-.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951). 
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were handed down, Thurgood Marshall wrote to one of his aca-
demic legal consultants that the opinions were "replete with road 
markings telling us where to go next."321 It was, to be sure, a 
long practical step from universities to elementary schools, but 
now it was clear that the Court would have to face the issue. 
With the help of the "road markings" in the 1950 trilogy, the 
Justices might even be persuaded to jettison Plessy altogether. So 
the stage was set for Brown. 
E. Explaining the Decision 
The lingering question about the Sweatt opmwn is why the 
Court opted for such a broad definition of equality when a nar-
rower one was available. One answer is that a narrower focus 
upon purely physical differences might not have produced so 
clear a result. In conference following oral argument, Chief Jus-
tice Vinson actually favored affirming the judgment of the state 
courts.322 Although at least seven of his colleagues disagreed,323 
and he ultimately not only changed his mind but wrote the opin-
ion, Vinson's initial reaction suggested that a restrictive notion of 
equality could promote endless debate. Other factors also may 
have pushed the Justices toward their final analysis. For example, 
well before the oral argument several members of the Court had 
thought carefully about the case. 324 Moreover, Justice Clark, an 
alumnus of The University of Texas law school, circulated a 
memorandum to his colleagues rejecting the state's position 
shortly after the argument.325 The cumulative effects of the gov-
321. Tushnet, supra note 17, at 433. 
322. Hutchinson, supra note 223, at 24-25. 
323. !d. at 24. 
324. Justice Burton's clerks had provided him with three detailed memoranda on 
Sweatt, A1cLaurin, and Henderson at least ten days before the argument. Justice Clark, the 
recently appointed former Attorney General, also received a detailed memorandum 
from his clerk. Finally, William T. Coleman, Jr., clerk to Justice Frankfurter, provided an 
extensive analysis of the legal issues for his mentor. See Hutchinson, supra note 223, at 
15-16, 19-21. 
325. ld. at 21-22. Justice Clark's memorandum suggests that the Law Teachers' Brief 
profoundly influenced his thinking about the case. For an edited version of the Clark 
memorandum, see id. at 89-90. Justice Clark wrote in part: 
[I]t is entirely possible that Negroes in segregated grammar schools ... would 
receive skills in ... elementary subjects equivalent to those of segregated 
white students, assuming equality in the texts, teachers, and facilities. 
But it is obvious to me that the same would not apply to graduate schools. 
There are many reasons: (1) white schools have higher standing in the commu-
nity as well as nationally, which means much to the graduate professional man; 
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ernment's confession of error and forceful condemnation of seg-
regation in Henderson and the outrageous facts of McLaurin must 
have had some impact. 
Ultimately, however, the Law Teachers' amicus brief seems 
to have shaped the Court's analysis. Because the Court declined 
to reach the constitutional issues which formed the centerpiece 
of their argument, one might minimize the influence of their 
brief. Such a view overlooks the reasoning of the unanimous 
opinion delivered by Chief Justice Vinson. This extraordinarily 
detailed and subtle analysis of the educational process had no 
analogue in the precedents. Both Justice Clark's memorandum 
and Sweatt's brief raised some of these issues, but not in de-
tail.326 Only the Law Teachers provided a systematic and sophis-
ticated comparison of the two schools. 
While it is impossible to determine the precise effect of the 
Law Teachers' submission, well-reasoned amicus briefs have 
played a substantial role in several leading cases.327 There could 
(2} the older and larger college has more alumni, which gives the graduate 
more professional opportunities; (3} the larger and older school attracts better 
professors; (4) competition among schools is much keener in the older and 
more established school, thus affording a wider professional competition; (5) 
the larger and older institution attracts a cross section of the entire State in its 
student body-affords a wider exchange of ideas-and, in the combat of ideas, 
~urnishes a greater variety of minds, backgrounds and opinions which is most 
ti?portant in the professions; (6) it takes years and years to establish a profes-
swnal school of top rank, affording law reviews, competition, medals, societies, 
etc., which a Negro school would never attain; (7) acquaintance is important in 
the professions and segregation prevents it, thus depriving the Negro of many 
state-wide opportunities. These and other reasons are those which I am sure 
have led all but nine of the States to abandon the "separate but equal" doctrine 
at the graduate level. 
Id. at 89-90. 
326. See Hutchinson, supra note 223, at 89-90; supra note 325; Brief for Petitioner at 
71-74. Most of the four pages in Sweatt's brief address differences in the physical plant 
and the faculty of the two schools. Most of the points which the Court discusses do not 
appear at all in Sweatt's brief. 
327. Perhaps the two most graphic recent examples of the influence of amicus briefs 
~n the decisio.n of important lawsuits have come in the racial disrimination context. In 
C objones Umv. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Court appointed William T. 
d ole~an,Jr., to argue as amicus curiae in support of an Internal Revenue Service policy 
9~~Ytng tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. !d. at 576; 456 U.S. 
. (1982). The Court acted after the Reagan administration reversed the long-stand-~ng :ederal position on this issue and urged that the case be dismissed as moot. For the 
~~~?ground to the Coleman appointment, see 461 U.S. at 585 n.9; The Supreme Court, 
-Term, 97 HARV. L. REv. 70, 262-63 n.l5 (1983). 
The other recent racial discrimination case in which an amicus brief played a signifi-~~nt role is Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which at least 
such briefs were submitted. !d. at 268 n. *. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court 
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be no doubt of the quality of the work that went into this particu-
lar brief. Most of the historical materials were drawn from an 
article that had appeared in the Columbia Law Review, 328 and the 
elaborate comparisons of the two schools involved these eminent 
professors in the sorts of analyses of curricular, personnel, and 
administrative matters with which they were continuously con-
cerned.329 Although the record contained ample evidence sup-
invalidating a preferential admissions program for minority applicants to the medical 
school of the University of California at Davis relied heavily upon a brief submitted on 
behalf of Columbia, Harvard, and Stanford Universities and the University of Penn-
sylvania in concluding that Davis could have adopted a more flexible approach similar to 
that used at Harvard College. !d. at 316-19 (opinion of Powell, j.) (citing Brief for Co-
lumbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University, and the University of Penn-
sylvania, as Amici Curiae). 
Cases arising in other contexts also reflect the influence of amici. In Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states. This re-
quired the partial overruling ofWolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), something which 
the Court conceded had been urged upon it only by the American Civil Liberties Union 
as amicus curiae. 367 U.S. at 646 n.3. Surprisingly, the appellant had not even cited 
IJ!olf, and the amicus brief simply requested the overruling without detailed argumenta-
tion in support of that position. !d. at 674 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the Court invalidated an ordinance 
that made persons who had been convicted of certain offenses liable for misdemeanor 
prosecution if they failed to register with the police upon their arrival in Los Angeles. 
The amicus curiae brief of Warren M. Christopher, whom the Court had invited to par-
ticipate on behalf of the appellant, 354 U.S. 936 (1957), apparently dominated the con-
sideration and decision of the case. See Packer, Mens Rea and the SupTeme GouT!, 1962 SuP. 
CT. REv. 107, 129. 
In J\1cCollum, supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text, Justice Frankfurter re-
portedly relied heavily upon an amicus brief submitted by the American Jewish Con-
gress, the Synagogue Council of America, and other Jewish organizations. See Harper & 
Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, I 01 U. PA. L. REV. 1172, 1174 (1953); Krislov, The 
Amicw Curiae B1·iej: hom Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE LJ. 694, 711 (1963). 
328. See Frank & Munro, The 01iginal Undentanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws .. ·· 50 
CoLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950). For a comparison of the use of the historical materials in 
the Law Teachers' Brief and in this article, see infra note 330. 
329. A number of members of the Committee were active in the Association of Amer-
ican Law Schools, one of the principal accrediting agencies in the field of legal educa-
tion. The Texas State law school received prompt approval from two other bodies, the 
American Association of Law Libraries and the American Bar Association, within a year 
of the opening of its permanent facilities in Houston. See 0. JoHNSON, supra note 19, at 
103-05, 108, 154. The AALS deferred action on the school's application for accredita-
tion at its December 1949 meeting because of the pendency of the Supreme Court ap-
peal in Sweatt. This deferral gave rise to widely conflicting interpretations. Compm"l' Biief 
for Respondents at 121 (arguing that Texas State actually satisfied all AALS criteria for 
accreditation) with Supplement to Law Teachers Brief (contending that AALS had taken 
no position on Texas State's compliance with accreditation criteria). The dean of the 
black law school suggested that the interest of the Committee in ending segregation led 
those of its members who held influential positions in the AALS to seek improperly to 
prevent or delay his institution's accreditation. See 0. JoHNSON, supra note 19, at 126-31. 
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porting the expansive conception of equality for which they 
argued, and while Sweatt's counsel could have devoted more at-
tention to the point, the suggestions of the prestigious and pre-
sumably disinterested Law Teachers Committee undoubtedly 
appeared to have come from impartial observers.330 That, in 
turn, may have made this approach more acceptable to at least 
some members of the Court. 
Finally, larger historical developments and broader social 
changes may have made the Court more sensitive to the issues 
presented in the case. First, the case arose shortly after the end 
of World War II, in which the nation had defeated a regime 
based upon an unimaginably virulent strain of racism. Parties in 
a number of discrimination cases heard during this era made this 
330. The Law Teachers Committee may not in fact have been disinterested in the 
outcome. The group was created at the initiative of Sweatt's attorneys, who felt that 
sound strategic considerations dictated the tactic. See R. KLUGER, supm note 7, at 275. 
On the disinterestedness of professors in the public arena, see D. MoYNIHAN, MAXIMUM 
FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING 167-205 (1968);]. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 47-63 
(1975). 
The treatment of some of the historical materials in the Law Teachers Brief illus-
trates some of the perils of combining the writing of court papers and the writing of 
history. See genemlly Kelly, Clio and the Cow·t: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 119, 
155-58. In their brief, the professors argued that Congress intended to outlaw segrega-
tion in education when it approved the fourteenth amendment. Law Teachers Brief, 
supra note 254, at 5-11, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 292-97. The article which pro-
vided the basis for much of this part of the brief, however, concluded that there could be 
"substantial difference of opinion concerning the dominant intent of the reconstruction 
dec~de as to mixed schools." Frank & Munro, supm note 328, at 155; see also Bickel, The 
Ongznal Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 59 (1955); Kelly, The 
Fow·teenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049, 1085-
86 (1956). But cf. R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 117-33 (Congress plainly did not intend 
t~ prohibit separate schools). In fairness, however, it should be noted that the conclu-
swns of the brief and the article do not differ meaningfully. Compare Law Teachers Brief, 
supra note 254, at 10-11, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 296-97 ("we do not have com-
plete evidence" of views of framers, but "dominant opinion" was that equal protection 
~ause of fourteenth amendment ~l~minated all race~based leg~l distincti~ns), with Frank 
f 7unro, supra note 328, at 162 ( 'rt was accepted VIrtually umnamously by supporters 
0 
ouneenth amendment that equal protection clause "forbade segregated schools"). 
_Finally, the dean of the black law school implied that some members of the Commit-
~e Improperly prevented the Association of American Law Schools from approving 
exas State's application for accreditation in 1949. See supm note 329. This claim, of 
course, goes to the heart of the Committee's disinterestedness. 
St More r~cently, some black critics have charged that opponents of accrediting Texas 
of~e acted m bad faith because they did not challenge the credentials of The University 
Th ~xas and other white law schools. See, e.g., O.jOHNSON, supra note 19, at 134;Jones, 
O~n~~as Southern Univmity School of Lmr-The Beginning, 4 TEx. S.U.L. REv. 197, 207 
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point with greater or lesser degrees of subtlety. 331 The Court 
undoubtedly was aware of the acerbic criticism that greeted its 
wartime decisions upholding the internment of hundreds of 
thousands of Japanese-Americans.332 Justice Jackson had been 
chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trial, a role he de-
scribed as "the most important, enduring, and constructive work 
of my life."333 Thus, the Court as an institution was more aware 
than ever before of the inconsistency between racial discrimina-
tion and the American creed. 334 
331. For example, the NAACP explicitly drew the connection between the fight 
against Nazism abroad and ~acism a.t home in a 1946 case that successfully challenge.d a 
state law requiring segregatiOn on Interstate as well as intrastate trains. The orgamza-
tion concluded its brief with the fo!!owing observation: 
Today we are just e.merging from a war in which all of the people of the United 
States were joined m a death struggle against the apostles of racism. We have 
already recognized by solemn subscription to the Charter of the United Nations 
... our duty, along with our neighbors, to eschew racism in our national life 
and to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion." How much clearer, therefore, must it be today ... that the national 
business of inter~ tate c?mmer.ce is not to be disfigured by disruptive local prac-
tices bred of raCial notwns ahen to our national ideals and to the solemn un-
dertakings of the community of civilized nations as weiJ. 
Brief for Appellant at 28, Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). 
In the three 1950 cases, the federal government also emphasized that racial dis~rim­
ination was inconsistent with basic American values and with the countrv's internallonal 
obligations. Attorney General McGI-ath made this point at oral argume~t. 18 U.~.L'Y· 
3277 (1950). The government's written submissions developed this contentiOn m 
greater detail. Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 60-63; Amicus Memorandum, supra 
note 303, at 12-13. 
332. The decisions were Ex pm·te Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). On 
the contemporary criticism, see, e.g., Rostow, The japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 
YALE LJ. 489 (1945). 
Whatever the reason, the Court's decisions during the post-War period in cases 
involving claims of discrimination against japanese-Americans certainly reflect greater 
sensitivity to the evils of race and nationality-based prejudice than did the war-time r~tl­
ings. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. Califorma, 
332 u.s. 633 (1948). 
The Court also decided a number of other important racial discrimination cases 
favorably to civil rights claimants during these years. E.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 
( 1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I ( 1948); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 
U.S. 28 (1948); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). 
333. Shawcross, Robert H. jacksons Contributions Dwing the Numnberg Trial, in MR. Jus-
TICE jACKSON: FouR LECTURES IN His HoNoR 87, 90 (1969); accm·d E. GERHART, 
AMERICA's AnvocATE: RoBERT H. jACKSON 228 ( 1958). 
334. One other factor may have made the Court marginally more sensitive to the 
pernicious effects of racial discrimination. In 194 7 jackie Robinson became the first 
black major league baseball player in this century. He emerged as an immediate star. 
More significantly, his success paved the way for several other black players and may 
have helped to break down some forms of discrimination in public accommodations and 
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Moreover, the post-War years were a time of greatly increased 
public concern with education. President Truman established a 
Commission on Higher Education which, in five volumes of re-
ports and recommendations, proposed a vastly expanded net-
work of postsecondary institutions that would receive substantial 
financial support from the federal government.335 Further, the 
GI Bill336 enabled more than two million veterans to obtain 
higher education that many otherwise could not have afforded. 
Leading educators publicly stated that these students as a group 
were the most promising ever to attend American colleges and 
universities.337 Below the college level, there was widespread ap-
prehension that the nation's elementary and secondary schools 
faced serious shortages of money and staff. Thus, strong biparti-
san support for federal aid to education emerged in Congress. In 
the spring of 1948, the Senate passed legislation providing such 
assistance for the first time in sixty years.338 In other words, at 
~he very time that Sweatt was pending before the Court, there was 
unprecedented popular concern with educational quality and 
with the benefits that the nation could realize from improvements 
in schooling at all levels. This b,roadly increased awareness may 
well have affected the Court's perception of the issues in the case, 
if only subconsciously. 
None of these background factors can detract from the mag-
nitude of the achievement of Thurgood Marshall and the other 
attorneys who represented Sweatt. As Pasteur was fond of saying 
in another context, "[C]hance favors only the prepared mind."339 
However propitious the circumstances may appear in retrospect, 
only superior lawyers who were willing to invest the necessary 
time and energy could have taken advantage of a favorable op-
to improve racial attitudes among some whites. See j. TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERI-
MENT 343-44 (1983). It is impossible to assess the independent effect of this factor. In 
any event, such matters are not supposed to influence Supreme Court decisions. But see 
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64 (1972). 
335. See PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1948). 
336. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, tit. II, 58 Stat. 284, 287-91. 
337. See D. RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE 12-15 (1983) . 
. 338. The Senate bill ultimately was defeated in the House due to acrimony over the 
mclusion of religious schools as beneficiaries of federal largesse. That issue prevented 
the enactment of any similar program for years thereafter. See id. at 26-42. 
339. R. Dusos, Lours PASTEUR: FREE LANcE oF SciENCE 101 (1960). 
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portunity. And as we have noted already, when the case began 
the circumstances seemed anything but promising. 
V. The Impact of the Decision 
The immediate effects of the Sweatt decision were somewhat 
mixed. In the narrowest terms, the ruling involved only one 
plaintiff and one law school. It did not prevent further litigation 
over the desegregation of other state colleges in Texas. 340 Nor 
did its apparently unambiguous emphasis upon true equality 
keep other states from continuing vigorously to resist the admis-
sion of blacks to theretofore all-white institutions of higher learn-
ing. Perhaps the most egregious evaswn involved Virgil 
Hawkins, who applied to the University of Florida law school in 
the spring of 1949 and gave up the effort after nine years of ob-
structionist maneuvers by state officials up to and including the 
governor. 341 Other states also desegregated their universities 
only under federal court order. 342 Violent resistance often ac-
companied the implementation of those orders.343 
340. See Shipp v. White, 5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 740 (N.D. Tex. 1960) (West Texas State 
College); White v. Smith, 1 Race Rei. L. Rep. 324 (W.D. Tex. 1955) (Texas Western 
College); Atkins v. Matthews, 1 Race Rei. L. Rep. 323 (E.D. Tex. 1955) (North Texas 
State College). 
341. For the sordid details of this story, see Cooper, Bmwn v. Board of Education and 
Virgil Darnell Haw him[:] Twenty-Eight Year.< and Si.x Petitiom to Justice, 64 J. NEGRO HrsT. 1 
(1979); Paulson & Hawkes, Desegregating the University of Florida Law School: Virgil Hawhins 
v. The Florida Board oJConlTol, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 59 (1984). 
Cooper's title is somewhat misleading. The six petitions referred to there included 
only those Hawkins filed with the Supreme Court of Florida; he also submitted four to 
the Supreme Court of the United States. One of those resulted in an order that ap-
peared to direct his admission. Florida ex Tel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413 
(1956) (per curiam). The state managed to place additional obstacles in his path, how-
ever, and Hawkins eventually took his degree at an out-of-state school. In November 
1976, more than a quarter-century after he applied to the University of Florida, Virgil 
Hawkins became a member of the Florida bar. 
342. See, e.g., Gantt v. Clemson Agric. College, 320 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1963); Holmes 
v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Ga. 1961). The experiences of Hamilton Holmes and 
Charlayne Hunter, the first blacks to enroll at the University of Georgia, are described in 
C. TRJLLIN, supra note 20. Holmes was elected to Phi Beta Kappa in his senior year. !d. 
at 179. 
343. The most notorious episodes occurred in Alabama and Mississippi. In 1955 
Autherine Lucy was admitted to the University of Alabama pursuant to a federal court 
order but was suspended and later expelled after riots broke out on campus. See Lucy v. 
Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala.) (ordering Ms. Lucy's admission to the university}, 
ajfd per wriam, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956); Lucy v. 
Adams, I Race Rei. L. Rep. 323 (N.D. Ala. 1956) (ordering Ms. Lucy readmitted but 
refusing to hold defendants in contempt); I Race Rei. L. Rep. 456 (order of board of 
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Indeed, the decision in Sweatt did not even stop the practice of 
providing scholarships for blacks to pursue advanced training at 
out-of-state universities. That practice continued for nearly a 
generation after Gaines purportedly invalidated it in 1938. For 
example, Fred D. Gray, the current president of the National Bar 
Association, received his law degree in 1954from Case Western 
Reserve University because his native Alabama preferred to give 
him a scholarship to study outside the state rather than provide 
any form of legal education for blacks within its own borders.344 
And as late as 1963, Georgia spent nearly $450,000 on such out-
of-state scholarships even after the University of Georgia had 
been desegregated by federal court order.345 
But Sweatt had much more than nominal significance. As a 
practical matter, it greatly facilitated the demise of segregation in 
trustees expelling her because of "baseless, outrageous and unfounded charges of mis-
conduct" against university officials); Lucy v. Adams, 2 Race Rei. L. Rep. 350 (N.D. Ala. 
1957) (upholding expulsion order). 
It took another court order and the deployment of federal troops nearly eight years 
later to enroll another black student in the university. See Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 
79 (N.D. Ala. I965); United States v. Wallace, 2I8 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ala. I963); Procla-
mation 3542, 3 C.F.R. 292 ( I959-1963 Comp.); Exec. Order II, Ill, 3 C.F.R. 771 ( 1959-
1963 Comp.); Govemor's Proclamation of june II, I963, 8 Race Rei. L. Rep. 457; Radio 
and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, PUBLIC PAPERS OF PRESI-
DENT jOHN F. KENNEDY 468 (1963). 
Beforejames Meredith was enrolled at the University of Mississippi, the state's two 
highest elected officials were held in contempt of court, several thousand federal troops 
and U.S. marshals were deployed on campus, and two persons were killed in rioting. See 
Meredith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. I962) (en bane) (holding governor in con-
tempt); Meredith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. I962) (en bane) (holding lieutenant 
governor in contempt). For an account of the entire episode by a member ofthe univer-
sity's faculty, see J. SILVER, MISSISSIPPI: THE CLOSED SociETY 107-40 (I964). See also 
l'v~eredith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 586, 588-89 (5th Cir. I962) (en bane) (denying motion to 
dissolve temporary restraining order against state and university officials and to dismiss 
contempt citations); Proclamation 3497, 3 C.F.R. 2254 (I959-l963 Comp.); Exec. Order 
11,053,3 C.F.R. 645 (1959-1963 Comp.); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388U.S. 130, I40-
4l, 159 n.22 (1967) (describing events that gave rise to libel suit by retired Gen. Edwin 
Walker in connection with his appearance near campus at the time of disturbances). 
344. Two Bar A·esidents, IN BRIEF, Sept. I985, at 9, 9 (alumni magazine of the Case 
':Yes tern Reserve University School of Law). The out-of-state scholarship program con-
tmued even after Gray graduated. See Lucy v. Adams, I34 F. Supp. 235, 238 (N.D. Ala.), 
a.ffdpercuriam, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 35I U.S. 931 (1956). 
. Gray returned to Alabama with his law degree and became a very successful civil 
nghts lawyer whose efforts went a long way toward undermining segregation there. He 
~?ued successfully as lead co-counsel in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (I960). 
f IS other clients have included Rosa Parks, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the NAACP, 
r;~~om riders, sit-in demonstrators, and the students who desegregated the University 
0 
34 abama and the Macon County public schools. 5. C. TRILL!N, supra note 20, at 48-49. 
~---------------
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universities and graduate and professional schools. By the fall of 
1950, more than 1,000 blacks were attending classes in previ-
ously all-white institutions without noticeable incident.346 More 
generally, Sweatt may have presaged closer judicial review of all 
educational issues. Since 1950, the Supreme Court has decided a 
wide array of cases dealing with academic matters. The results 
do not conform to any particular philosophical pattern, but they 
do share one common characteristic. Whatever the outcome on 
the merits, the Court generally has carefully and explicitly taken 
account. of the special place of education in American society in 
considering whether the governmental regulation in question 
passes muster. This has been true· in cases concerning the consti-
tutional status of public education, 347 the first amendment rights 
of teachers,348 the speech and associational rights of students,349 
control over curricular content, 350 policies for removing books 
from schoollibraries,351 procedures for disciplining and remov-
ing students from the classroom, 352 and the liability of school of-
ficials for violations of students' rights. 353 One ought not 
overstate this point because the Court has never cited Sweatt 
outside the equal protection context. Nonetheless, the analysis 
of the educational issues in that case marked something of an 
intellectual Rubicon for the Court; after crossing it, the Justices 
may have found more careful analysis of such issues to be pro-
gressively easier. 
346. Ransmeier, The Fourteenth Amendment and the "Sepamte but Equal" Doctrine, 50 
MICH. L. REv. 203, 240-41 (1951); Taylor, The Demise of Race Distinctions in Graduate Educa-
tion, 1 DUKE B.J. 135, 150-52 (1951). 
347. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973). 
348. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,486-87 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 129-32 
(1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion); id. at 
261-63 (Frankfurter,]., concurring in the result); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 
551, 558-59 (1956). 
349. E.g., Healy v.James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81, 185-94 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Commun. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07, 512-13 (1969). 
350. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-09 (1968). 
351. Board of Educ v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864, 866, 868 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
352. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct., 507,511-15 (1985) (substan-
tive standard for academic dismissal); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84-91 
(1978) (procedural standard for academic dismissal); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 
660-63 (1977) (imposition of corporal punishment); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-
76, 580 (1975) (procedural standard for disciplinary suspension). 
353. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318-22 (1975). 
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Ultimately, however, the significance of Sweatt should be as-
sessed in the context in which it arose. The case was part of a 
concerted litigation strategy designed to overturn segregation. It 
was tried and argued on the theory that no separate black law 
school could possibly be equal to an all-white institution. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court decision dealt a crippling blow to 
"separate but equal" educational programs. Read literally, the 
ruling applied only to a pair of law schools. As a matter of logic, 
however, it seemed to contain no limiting principle. Viewed 
strictly in those terms, Brown seemed almost an a fortiori case in 
which the result flowed inexorably from that in Sweatt. 
To appreciate the intimate logical connection between the 
two decisions, one must understand that Sweatt rested upon three 
central propositions. The first was that the intangible differences 
between the two law schools rendered them intrinsically unequal. 
The second was that race-based enrollment restrictions rendered 
the black school an academic vacuum which limited the interplay 
of ideas and the exchange of views. The third was that, whatever 
the official rationale, segregation constituted a formal statement 
that blacks were unworthy of full membership in the community. 
All of these propositions applied with great force not only to law 
schools, but at all levels of education. Thus, however narrowly 
the Court phrased its ruling, the result could plausibly be inter-
preted as the death knell of segregated schooling.354 
The lawyers for the NAACP, however, correctly believed that 
. 354. Some contemporaneous co~mentators believed that Sweatt and IV!cLaurin effec-
t~vely had invalidated all forms of educational segregation. See., e.g., Note, Equal Educa-
tz.onal Facilities Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 WASH • 
U.L.Q 594, 615 (Sweatt "did in effect overrule [the Plessy] doctrine by implying that no 
constitutional equality can exist where one is compelled by state law to study in an 'aca-
demic vacuum'"); 3 ALA. L. REv. 181, 182 (1950) ("a careful reading of the cases indi-
cates most decidedly that the attitude of the Court must be interpreted definitely to be 
that segregation is unconsitutional per se "). 
Others believed that the Court essentially had ended segregation at the graduate 
an~ professional level while leaving the way open to extend its. ruling to colleges and 
ultimately to lower levels of the educational ladder. See, e.g., Hyman, Segregation and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (1950); Roche, Education, Segregation 
and the Supreme Court-A Political Analysis, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 952-53 (1951); Waite, 
The Negro in the Supreme Court: Five }:;ears ldore, 35 MINN. L. REV. 625, 639 (1951); The 
Suprem~ Court, 1949 Term, 64 HARV. L. REv. 114, 130-31 (1950). Many regarded this 
extensiOn as all but inevitable. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Negro and the Law in the United 
~tales, 14 Moo. L. REV. 446, 461 (1951); Note, The Fall of an Unconstitutional Fiction-The 
Separate but Equal" Doctrine, 30 NEB. L. REV. 69, 82 (1951); 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 555, 559 
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the Court would not regard the constitutionality of segregation 
at the elementary and secondary level as so straightforward a 
matter. 355 The intangible factors which occupied so prominent a 
place in Sweatt seemed less important in the context of grade 
schools, while the number of persons directly affected by deseg-
regation at that level was much larger. Accordingly, the lawyers 
refined and amplified the arguments that they introduced in 
Sweatt as the grade school cases made their way up to the 
Supreme Court. The expectation that these cases would prove 
more difficult was borne out in the event: the Justices struggled 
through two rounds of briefing and oral argument before reach-
ing their unanimous decision in Brown. 356 In doing so, they ac-
cepted each of the propositions that formed the basis of Sweatt. 357 
Therefore, they concluded that "[s]eparate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal,"358 and that any system of state-imposed 
segregation necessarily violates the fourteenth amendment.359 
In a very real sense, then, Sweatt converted the demise of Plessy 
from a long-range dream to a substantiallikelihood.360 
(1951); 39 GEo. LJ. 145, 148 (1950); 36 VA. L. REv. 797,800 (1950); 8 WAsH. & LEE L. 
REV. 54, 54 (1951). 
A few commentators, mostly from the South, suggested that segregation might re-
main permissible below the college and university level, at least so long as the states 
made good faith efforts to equalize black schools. Significantly, several of these writers 
endorsed the Court's rulings; none criticized the decisions. See, e.g., Note, Implications of 
Recent Cases an Education of Minority Racial Groups, 3 U. FLA. L. REV. 358, 367 (1950); 2 
MERCER L. REV. 272, 273 (1950); 5 MIAMI L.Q 150, 152-53 (1950). 
355. SeeR. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 284, 290-94; Frank, supra note 253, at 42. 
356. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,488-89 (1954). See generally R. KLUGER, 
supm note 7, at 543-699. 
357. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954). 
358. !d. at 495. 
359. For the same reasons, segregation instituted by the federal government was held 
to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 
497 (1954). 
360. Although Brawn ultimately resolved the constitutionality of segregation, Sweatt 
has retained independent signficance. Most recently, for example, it was the principal 
authority upon which Justice Powell relied for the proposition that the goal of achieving 
a diverse student body is a permissible basis for educational institutions to consider race 
as one factor in determining which applicants to admit to their programs. Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,313-14 (1978) (opinion of Powell,]., announc-
ing the judgment). 
Interestingly, Sweatt is not mentioned in any of the opinions in Mississippi Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), a 5-to-4 decision in which the Court held that a 
state could not operate a nursing school for women only. It is at least possible that the 
analysis employed in Sweatt might have helped to clarify some of the questions at issue in 
Hagan. 
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VI. Epilogue 
Heman Marion Sweatt never became a lawyer. He entered 
The University ofTexas pursuant to the Supreme Court decision 
vindicating his "personal and present" right to legal educa-
tion.361 Later on he dropped out, although he almost certainly 
would have graduated from Texas State.362 That black college, 
its name changed to Texas Southern University,363 has survived 
its clouded origins and attained modest academic respectabil-
ity.364 Its law school, despite repeated reports of its impending 
demise,365 has produced the majority of black attorneys in the 
state.366 Finally, in the ultimate irony of a case in which that qual-
ity abounds, in 1976 the institution that Sweatt refused to enter 
was renamed the Thurgood Marshall School of Law, in honor of 
a man who had spent the better part of four years as Sweatt's 
attorney trying to make sure that the infant institution would be 
still born. 367 
361. 339 U.S. at 635. 
362. See 0. JoHNSON, supra note 19, at 173; L. MILLER, supra note 9, at 341; cf supra 
n?tes 103-105 & 113-115 and aocompanying text (concerning Uoyd Gaines and Ada 
S1puel Fisher). 
363. Act of April 20, 1951, ch. 65, § 1, 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws 109. 
364. Texas Southern University is one of a handful of colleges "[a]t the head of the 
~egro academic procession ... [which] would probably fall near the middle of the na-
l!onal academic procession." C. JENCKS & D. RIESMAN, THE AcADEMIC REVOLUTION 433 
(Anchored. 1969). 
365. See id. at 437; 0. JoHNSON, supra note 19, at 175; cf Frank, supra note 253, at 33 
(because of prior discrimination, blacks admitted to white law schools have high rate of 
academic difficulty, in turn giving inadequate black schools continued vitality). 
366. See Washington, History and the Role of Black Law Schools, 5 N.C. CENT. LJ. 158, 
i72 0974); cf King, The Case for the Black Law School: The Texas Southern University Story, I 
EX. S.U. INTRA. L. REv. 73 (1970) (continuing need for black law schools). 
367. See Symposium, 4 TEX. S.U.L. REv. I (1977). 
